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University of Pittsburgh, 2019
This dissertation studies the first Great Migration of African Americans from the rural South
to Urban areas in the northern United States. While most existing research has focused on
the experiences of the migrants themselves, I am focused on how this influx of rural black
migrants impacted outcomes for African Americans who were already living in the north
and had already attained a modicum of economic success. Common themes throughout this
dissertation involve the use of the complete-count U.S. population census to link records
across years. In the first chapter, I linked northern-born blacks from 1910 to 1930 to study
how the arrival of new black residents affected the employment outcomes of existing northern-
born black residents. I find that southern black migrants served as both competitors and
consumers to northern-born blacks in the labor market. In the second chapter, my co-authors
and I study the role of segregated housing markets in eroding black wealth during the Great
Migration. Building a new sample of matched census addresses from 1930 to 1940, we find
that racial transition on a block was associated with both soaring rental prices and declines in
the sales value of homes. In other words, black families paid more to rent housing and faced
falling values of homes they were able to purchase. Finally, the third chapter compares the
rates of intergenerational occupational mobility by both race and region. I find that racial
mobility difference in the North was more substantial than it was in the South. However,
regional mobility difference for blacks is greater than any gap in intergenerational mobility
by race in prewar American. Therefore, the first Great Migration helped blacks successfully
translate their geographic mobility into economic mobility.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.0 COMPETITORS AND CONSUMERS:
THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT MIGRATION ON EMPLOYMENT
OUTCOMES OF BLACK NORTHERNERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 The Great Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2 How the Great Migration Changed the North . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 DATA AND MEASUREMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1 Creating the Linked Census Sample for Black Northerners 1910-30 9
2.3.2 Measuring the Occupational Earnings Score and Rank . . . . . . . 10
2.3.3 Measuring Migration Inflow 1910-30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.4 Describing the Black Northerners in the Sample . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1 Baseline Estimating Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.2 Instrument for Migration Inflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.2.1 IV Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.2.2 First Stage Results and Instrument Validity . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 ESTIMATION RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5.1 Effects on Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5.2 Effects on Occupational Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5.3 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
v
2.6 MECHANISMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.6.1 Competitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.6.2 Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8 FIGURES AND TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.0 RACIAL SEGREGATION IN HOUSING MARKETS
AND THE EROSION OF BLACK WEALTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.1 Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.2 Related Literature in Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3 DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4 EMPIRICAL APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.5 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5.1 Baseline Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5.2 Heterogeneity Across Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5.3 Decomposing Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5.4 Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6 DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.8 FIGURES AND TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.0 INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY IN PREWAR AMERICA:
A COMPARISON BY RACE AND REGION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2.1 Linking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2.2 Occupational Transition Matrices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3 METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4.1 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
vi
4.4.2 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.6 TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
APPENDIX A. COMPETITORS AND CONSUMERS:
THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT MIGRATION ON EMPLOYMENT
OUTCOMES OF BLACK NORTHERNERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.1 CREATING THE LINKED CENSUS SAMPLE FOR
NORTHERN BLACKS 1910-30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.2 CONSTRUCTING OCCUPATIONAL EARNINGS SCORE . . . . . . . . 106
A.3 ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
APPENDIX B. RACIAL SEGREGATION IN HOUSING MARKETS
AND THE EROSION OF BLACK WEALTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
B.1 CONSTRUCTING THE MATCHED ADDRESS SAMPLE . . . . . . . . . 119
B.2 DETAILS ON METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
APPENDIX C. INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY IN PREWAR
AMERICA: A COMPARISON BY RACE AND REGION . . . . . . . 129
C.1 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
vii
LIST OF TABLES
1 Descriptive Statistics of Black Northerners, 1910 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2 Summary Statistics by the Degree of Migration Inflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3 Migration and Black Northerners’ Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4 Alternative Measures for Occupational Earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5 Migration and Prob. of Employment by Skill Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6 Migration and Labor Force Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7 Probability of Black Northerners Holding Certain Occupation in 1930 . . . . 34
8 Migration and Rank by Skin Color and Father’s SES Status . . . . . . . . . . 35
9 Summary Statistics for Addresses in Baseline Matched Dataset . . . . . . . . 65
10 Main Results: Price and Occupancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11 Capitalization Rates by Occupancy Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
12 Heterogeneity by City Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
13 Results for Racial Transition and Proximity to Ghetto . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
14 Selection into Racial Transition in Baseline Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
15 Predicting Racial Transition in Baseline Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
16 Rental Indicators for Addresses on Blocks that Remain White . . . . . . . . 72
17 Match Rate by Race and Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
18 Intergenerational Occupational Mobility, by Race and Region . . . . . . . . . 85
19 Summary Measures of Altham Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
20 Intergenerational Occupational Mobility, Blacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
21 Summary Measures of Altham Statistics, All Blacks in the North . . . . . . . 90
A1 A Simple Example in Building “Ground Truth” Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
viii
A2 Probit Regression on the Match Dummy in the Human Review Process . . . 103
A3 Probit Marginal Effects on Linkage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A4 A Made-up Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
A5 First Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
A6 Robustness on Weighted Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A7 Robustness on A Different Instrument Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
B1 Address Statistics for Block Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
B2 Address Sample Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
B3 Selection into Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
C1 Summary Measures of Altham Statistics, Excluding Farmers . . . . . . . . . 130
C2 Summary Measures of Altham Statistics, Separating Farm Labors from Un-
skilled Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
C3 Summary Measures of Altham Statistics, Exact Matches . . . . . . . . . . . 132
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Black and White County Median Occupational Earning Ratio in 1910 (Before
the Great Migration) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2 Migration Inflow in Northern Counties Between 1910 and 1930 . . . . . . . . 24
3 IV Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4 Employment Rates and Migration Inflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5 Share of Unskilled Movers vs. Migration Inflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6 Relationship between 1930 Black Share and Black Population Growth . . . . 59
7 Semiparametric Relationship Between Percent Black and Rents . . . . . . . . 60
8 Semiparametric Relationship Between Percent Black and Home Values . . . . 61
9 Effect of Racial Transition on Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
10 Effect of Racial Transition on Occupancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11 Ownership Rate vs. Pct. Black on the Block in 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A1 Match Quality Assessment Over Absolute/Relative Threshold: False Matches 97
A2 Match Quality Assessment Over Absolute/Relative Threshold: Missed Matches 98
A3 Inverse Relationship Between False Match Rates and Missed Match Rates . . 99
A4 Optimal Thresholds: Northern-born Blacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A5 Comparing Linked Samples Across Linking Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A6 Sensitivity and Plausibility of the Occupational Earnings Score . . . . . . . . 108
A7 Destinations for Migrants and Black Northerners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
A8 Advertisement from African-American Newspaper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A9 White Collar Jobs Held By Northern-born Blacks in 1930 . . . . . . . . . . . 114
x
A10 Top 20 Occupations Among White Collar Group By Share Changes between
1910 and 1930 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
B1 Geocoded Detroit Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
B2 Racial Transition in Geocoded Blocks in Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
xi
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Great Migration of African Americans from the rural South to Urban areas
in the northern United States, there were small communities of middle-class blacks living
in the North. While research has investigated the importance of migration improving the
fortunes of southern-born blacks, less is known about the impact of the Great Migration
on existing black communities. This dissertation focused on how this influx of rural black
migrants impacted outcomes for African Americans who were already living in the north and
had already attained a modicum of economic success.
In the first chapter, I use individual U.S. census data to construct a new panel dataset
of northern-born blacks from 1910 to 1930 to study how the arrival of new black residents
shaped their economic fortunes. I exploit variation in the extent of in-migration across
northern counties and instrument for black inflows by interacting pre-existing demographic
patterns in the South with earlier black settlement patterns in the North. I find that, while
in-migration decreased the likelihood for black northerners to be employed, it led them to
have more high-status, better-paying jobs in 1930. Furthermore, these effects are not ho-
mogeneous throughout the northern black population. Since southern blacks served as both
competitors and consumers to northern blacks, the economically disadvantaged northern
blacks suffered from the competition pressure exerted by migrants while the economically
advantaged northern blacks obtained the better occupations supported by in-migration.
Residential segregation accompanying the Great Migration made housing demand out-
pace housing supply for blacks in the northern cities. Blockbusting, or opening a new street
to black settlement, was profitable because black families were desperate for housing and
would outbid whites for apartments and homes outside of the existing ghetto. In the second
chapter, my co-authors and I study the role of segregated housing markets in eroding black
1
wealth in prewar America. Using a sample of matched addresses from prewar American
cities, we find that rental prices and occupancy soared by about 40 percent in blocks that
transitioned from all white to majority black. While, on these same blocks, home values fell
on average by 10 percent and by a staggering 50 percent in major African American destina-
tions such as Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit. These findings suggest that, because of the
segregated housing market, black families faced dual barriers to wealth accumulation: they
paid more in rent for similar housing while the homes they were able to purchase rapidly
declined in value.
In the third chapter, I study the economic mobility of the existing population of northern-
born blacks relative to that of southern-born blacks and northern-born whites. Previous
studies examining the racial differences in intergenerational mobility in the early twenti-
eth century have mainly focused on southern blacks. Since northern blacks began with
a relatively better socioeconomic status than southern blacks, my prior is that northern
blacks might have been better at capitalizing on their advantage in occupational attain-
ment. Through building new samples of northerners with intergenerational linkages between
1910 and 1930, I show that northern blacks indeed had a different father-son occupational
association from southern blacks; moreover, their father-son occupational association resem-
bles more closely to that of northern whites than to that of southern blacks. While the
black-white mobility gap in this period would have closed in the South if blacks had the
same occupational opportunity as whites, it would persist in the North. These findings sug-
gest that heterogeneity shaped by regional origin within and across racial groups should not
be overlooked in addressing racial disparities in economic mobility.
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2.0 COMPETITORS AND CONSUMERS:
THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT MIGRATION ON
EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES OF BLACK NORTHERNERS
“Its imprint is everywhere in urban life. The configuration of the cities as we know them, the
social geography of black and white neighborhoods, the spread of the housing projects as well as
the rise of a well-scrubbed black middle class, along with the alternating waves of white flight
and suburbanization - all of these grew, directly or indirectly, from the response of everyone
touched by the Great Migration.”
-Isabel Wilkerson, The Warmth of Other Suns
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Scholarship tends to view the Great Migration, a movement of approximately 6 million
blacks from the agricultural South to the industrial North, as the key mechanism in black
economic progress over the twentieth century (e.g., Margo (1995); Smith and Welch (1989);
Farley and Allen (1987)). Compared to their southern counterparts, blacks in the North
were economically and socially better-off at the turn of the century, and some even achieved
middle-class status (see Figure 1). For example, in 1910 the median annual earning for
southern blacks was $235, 62 percent less than their white southern counterparts, while the
comparable earnings disadvantage for northern blacks, whose median annual earning was
$633, was only 37 percent.1 Thus poor southern blacks could obtain significant economic
returns by migrating north. Though economists have made recent advancements in under-
standing the importance of the Great Migration on southern-born blacks (e.g., Alexander et
1The earnings disadvantage is measured as the difference in the median occupational earnings score between blacks
and whites using the 1910 complete-count census data.
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al. (2017); Collins and Wanamaker (2017); Collins and Wanamaker (2014)), the economic
experience of black northerners, who had longstanding roots in the North, with respect to
the significantly increased local black populations, remains largely unexplored.2
Between 1910 and 1930, the number of black workers in the North almost tripled.3 The
anticipated effect of such a large inflow of migrants on black northerners’ employment out-
comes is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, if black workers from any region are
seen as substitutes in the labor market, migration would act as a supply shock, decreasing
wages or employment of northerners. Labor market crowding could have also reinforced the
traditional racial norms and inflamed already existing racial tensions, further disadvantaging
northern black workers. On the other hand, the inflow of southern blacks could have cre-
ated a new demand for black-owned establishments and so northern blacks, who had more
wealth than southern blacks, might have responded to this demand by becoming more en-
trepreneurial, ultimately increasing their occupational standing. This paper finds support
for both impacts.
A natural strategy for studying the effect of in-migration on the labor market oppor-
tunities of black northerners is to examine the relationship between employment outcomes
and migrant inflow across migration destinations. However, such exercise is subject to three
sources of bias. First, migrants may have been attracted to places with economic opportu-
nity, which would cause OLS estimates for both employment rates and earnings to be biased
upwards. By contrast, given the discrimination and information barrier faced by migrants in
the northern labor market, they may have only been able to settle in declining areas where
there are fewer occupational upgrading opportunities, causing OLS estimates for earnings to
be biased downwards. Second, northerners may relocate in response to their expected labor
market opportunities, causing sample composition bias when analyzing at the geographic
aggregation level. Lastly, omitted variables in the cross-sectional data could also cause the
OLS estimates to be biased.4
2Several papers explore competition between first and second waves southern blacks in the postwar period, e.g.,
Derenoncourt (2019); Boustan (2009). However, the first and second waves southern blacks are more similar to each
other and this paper will specifically look at blacks who already lived in the North and who see themselves as a
distinct group.
3Calculation is based on counting the black population aged 10 and above in the northern labor force for both
census years (Ruggles et al. (2017)).
4For example, Chetty and Hendren (2016) shows that the neighborhoods in which children grow up shape their
adult labor market outcomes; Hout (1984)) finds that black men who experienced occupational upgrading during the
4
Some of these obstacles can be overcome by constructing an individual-level panel dataset
of black northerners (Foged and Peri (2016)). The availability of the digitized complete-count
census data containing personally identifiable information in the prewar era made it possible
to follow individuals over time. Using the supervised machine-learning approach introduced
in Feigenbaum (2016), I build a new linked sample of northern-born blacks from 1910 to
1930 where I can observe a broad set of pre-migration sociodemographic characteristics to
minimize the omitted variable bias. The benefits of having a linked sample also include
the elimination of composition bias by comparing the outcomes of black northerners who
already lived in migrant-receiving places in 1910 and the accessibility of critical demographic
characteristics for investigating the potential mechanisms.
I address the endogeneity of migration inflow by taking advantage of the historical fact
that current migrants tend to settle at the same place where early migrants from the same
birth state already live, due to social networks and access to railroads.5 Thus, a county’s
share of southern-born black residents before the migration is used as an instrument for the
current settlement patterns of migrants from that particular southern state (Card (2001)).
To address the concern that the aggregate inflow of black migrants is also correlated with
local labor demand shocks because migrants cluster geographically in certain northern cities,
I substitute the total migrant inflow from each southern state by its cohort size of blacks
at risk to migrate but still living in the South in 1910. Therefore, the flow component of
my instrument rests on the spatial and age distribution of blacks in the South prior to the
migration.
I find that in-migration (from 1910-1930) resulted in significantly less employment but
better occupational attainment for black northerners in 1930. For both outcomes, my 2SLS
estimates are larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates. On the one hand, it is consistent
with the historical view that migrants tended to move to places where jobs were relatively
more abundant; on the other hand, it suggests that these places migrants chose offered
fewer occupational upgrading opportunities to the new black workers.6 Since my measure
1960s tended to come from advantaged social backgrounds in terms of their fathers’ occupations.
5Carrington et al. (1996): “While this chain migration centered on kinship ties, the connections extended beyond
family lines. For example, Southern ‘migration clubs’ would often finance a sequence of trips to the North for their
members, and young males were usually the first to go.”
6From the perspective of southern black migrants, any place in the North might have been better in terms of
earnings and safety compared to their southern conditions. In the South, wages were paid in some form other than
5
of migration inflow compares locations where northern blacks lived in 1910, the observed
effects could have come from two sources the creation of competition and new employment
opportunity by migrants and the displacement of employment opportunity by the relocation
of northerners between 1910 and 1930. To gain a better understanding of the source of
the effects, I restrict the sample to stayers who lived in the same county in both census
years. If the effects are indeed due to in-migration, I expect to find similar effects on the
stayer sample. The results confirm my expectation; moreover, it suggests that out-migration
of northerners is helpful only in securing employment, but not so much in regards to the
quality of their employment.
I hypothesize that competition is the channel through which in-migration lower the em-
ployment of northern blacks. To investigate, I examine the relationship between in-migration
and employment status for both northern-born whites, and northern-born blacks from dif-
ferent economic backgrounds. Since black and white workers were not considered as close
substitutes in production, I expect in-migration to have no effect on the likelihood of em-
ployment for northern-born whites. Moreover, since migrants were often low-skilled share-
croppers prior to migrating, I expect the competition to be concentrated in the unskilled
occupations. My estimates show that in-migration does not have a negative effect on whites
regardless of their skill level, and in-migration exerts competitive pressure only on the un-
skilled northern-born blacks, a closer substitute to southern black migrants. Moreover, I
show that in-migration did not disproportionately discourage northern black workers from
participating in the labor force. Together, these findings suggest that competition with
southern black migrants leads to lower employment for black northerners.
I close this chapter by documenting the mechanism through which in-migration increases
northern-born blacks’ occupational standing. The increasing black population in the segre-
gated black communities created skilled employment opportunities for blacks. Northern-born
blacks, especially those from more advantaged backgrounds, were able to reallocate their
labor from unskilled to skilled occupations because they have the comparative advantage
concerning access to capital and white support.
cash once a year. By contrast, the wages paid in cash by the week or month in the North seemed “fabulous sums
promising speedy wealth and success.” Therefore, the most immediate concern for most migrants was whether they
could find a job outside the South. Moreover, the ultimate gain from moving to the highest paid place could have
been lower than other places when considering the transportation cost.
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2.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
2.2.1 The Great Migration
From the introduction of slavery until the Civil War, black Americans mainly resided in
the slave-owning South. However, all of the blacks living in the North before the Civil War
were free, and some of them had achieved middle-class status. After Emancipation, the
deprivation associated with share tenancy farming and the racial oppression of Jim Crow
caused northward movement of southern blacks in search of a better life. However, northern
cities in the late nineteenth century, the portals of industrial America for millions of European
immigrants, had fewer opportunities for African Americans. Low-wage and low-skilled jobs
were fulfilled by white Europeans.
Before the Great Migration, the small northern black population gained their livelihood
mainly in domestic and personal service (Frazier (1957)). Despite restrictions with em-
ployment opportunities in industry and white-collar occupations, a few of them were found
in a wide range of skilled occupations, such as physicians, dentists, journalists, attorneys,
clergymen, and proprietors (e.g., Brady (1996)). Though residentially segregated from the
whites, they did not suffer much discrimination in utilizing public institutions (Logan et
al. (2015); Massey and Denton (1993)). The leading blacks were mainly supported by the
white community, both economically and politically. They also maintained close social and
professional relationships with whites (Katzman (1975)).
The outbreak of World War I (1914-1918) led to increased demand for manufactured
goods throughout the industrial North. The curtailment of cheap immigrant labor by war
and later the enactment of the Immigration Acts made the northern employers turn to do-
mestic workers for factory employment. At the same time, destructive conditions in southern
agriculture such as the boll weevil and devastating floods pushed large numbers of black la-
borers out of cotton farming. As a result of these factors, southern blacks began migrating
to the North.7 This massive movement later became known as the Great Migration, which
was slowed down by the Great Depression, then resumed in the 1940s, and lasted until 1970.
7For example, the bleak job prospects and physical violence in the Jim Crow regime, the lure of higher wages
in the North, the industrial recruitment campaigns, and the discontent spread by black press such as the Chicago
Defender (DeSantis (1998)).
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2.2.2 How the Great Migration Changed the North
A direct consequence of the Great Migration is that the size of the urban black population
in the North significantly increased after 1910. For example, the black population in Wayne
County, Michigan, increased from 7,241 to 131,836 between 1910 and 1930, with southern
black migrants account for 76% of the change. “With generally minuscule black populations
before the Great Migration,” noted in Tolnay (2003), “Northern and Western cities had
achieved a relatively stable state of race relations, albeit one characterized by distinct racial
inequality. That situation began to change, however, as waves of migrants from the South
produced extraordinary growth in local black populations.”
The current view of how black employment in the North was affected is mixed. Gottlieb
(1996) describes that “blacks in the North saw their occupations gradually compressed from
a heterogeneous range of jobs into a comparatively narrow spectrum of employment.” Blacks
in the North were not only confined to the lowest-status jobs, but also consigned to black
neighborhoods regardless of their social class and geographic origin, through racial violence,
bombing, and white flight. Racial hostility increasingly blocked blacks access to a variety
of amenities and necessities, such as theaters and health service (Trotter (1985)). By 1930,
widespread interracial contact was no longer a phenomenon in American cities.
Despite the competition that underlaid the struggle for jobs and housing, the growing
black population in the ghetto formed the demographic and financial foundation for the
emergence of a larger black middle class between 1910 and 1930. The new black middle class
was owners of small businesses as well as professional elite, who almost exclusively serve the
needs of black clientele.8 For instance, black ministers catered to black congregations, and
black writers covered their social interests.9 The number of blacks engaged in professional,
business, and clerical occupations in the North doubled, increased from 55,586 in 1910 to
100,777 by 1930.
8Higgs (1977) wrote that “Discrimination outside the market sector had an important influence in determining
the opportunities open to blacks inside the market sector. [...] A large, concentrated, black community allowed the
emergence of a more complex and developed black community with its own merchants, craftsmen, and professional
people.”
9Urban black churches experienced significant growth during the migration era. For example, Abyssinian Baptist
Church is founded in 1910 by Adam Clayton Powell, Sr., in Harlem. This church had become the largest in the nation
by 1930, with over twenty thousand members. Other black churches, such as the Mount Olivet Baptist Church in
Chicago and the Bethel AME Church (Mother Bethel) in Philadephia, all had a considerable number of members
and became centers of religious activity.
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Increased black populations in the North also granted blacks more political power, which
yielded employment opportunities for blacks in the public sector.10 For example, the Mil-
waukee County Board of Supervisors created the position of “Social Worker (For Colored
People)” in 1930 in response to political pressure from blacks to serve the increasingly seg-
regated black population. Police, school board, and other public departments followed suit
(Trotter (1985)).
2.3 DATA AND MEASUREMENT
I use the regression-based, supervised machine-learning approach introduced in Feigenbaum
(2016) to link individuals across censuses. Since it is a fairly standard approach, I briefly
introduce my linking procedure here and the construction of key variables in this analy-
sis. Details on the matching, representativeness, and sensitivity tests are provided in the
Appendix. Lastly, I describe the black northerners in my sample.
2.3.1 Creating the Linked Census Sample for Black Northerners 1910-30
I begin with an initial sample from 1910 that includes all the northern-born black males, aged
0 to 17 inclusive, residing with their parent or step-parent in the North.11 This restriction
results in a total of 60,705 individuals who were young enough to be living with their fathers
or household-head mothers in 1910 and were old enough to be participating in the labor force
in 1930. They are also at an age where they can change their occupational and educational
choices in response to the migrant inflow. I then find each individual in the complete-count
1930 census, limiting the set of possible matches for any given black in 1910 to be the black
10“There was no denial of voting rights in the North, and soon African American politicians were being increasingly
elected to office. As early as 1915, blacks served on the city council in Chicago, as they did in 1919 in New York.
By 1928, Oscar DePriest of Chicago had become the first northern black congressman and the first Black man to sit
in Congress since 1901. In key industrial states like Ohio, New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania black voters often
swayed the balance of power between the Republican and Democratic parties, which gave them state and national
influence far out of proportion to their numbers. To serve them a new urban black middle class emerged, out of the
growth of black community services.”
11Following previous literature, I define the following 14 states as the South: Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, and West
Virginia (Collins and Wanamaker (2015); Collins and Wanamaker (2014); Boustan (2009)). For convenience, all other
parts of the contiguous United States are referred to as the North.
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males in 1930 who meet the following criteria: born in the same state, born in the same year
± 3 years, have the first letter of first and last names match, and have a Jaro-Winkler string
distance in the first and last names of greater than 0.8.12
The basic idea of the machine-learning approach is to have the algorithm learn the
implicit rules that a careful and well-trained researcher uses to match records across historical
samples and replicates these decisions for the full dataset (Feigenbaum (2016)). Therefore, I
manually build a “ground truth” sample of approximately 5% of the initial sample to guide
the algorithm.13 In the case when an individual has more than one best match, he will have
no match to be declared since it is impossible for me to decide which pairing is correct.
Similarly, a person from 1930 cannot be matched to more than one individual from 1910.
For the algorithm to find the best match, I also need to choose a value between 0 and
1 for the absolute threshold and a value between 1 and infinity for the relative threshold.
With the goal to minimize both the false match rate and the missed match rate, I set the
absolute threshold at 0.36 and the relative threshold at 1.05.14 The corresponding sample
match rate is 40.68%, along with an average false match rate of 4.87% and an average missed
match rate of 11.98%. These rates compare favorably with other studies linking across U.S.
census files at the beginning of the twentieth century.15
2.3.2 Measuring the Occupational Earnings Score and Rank
Because wage data was not collected before 1940, scholars have developed approaches to esti-
mate an individual’s occupational earnings as a proxy for labor market outcomes (e.g., Collins
and Wanamaker (2017); Ruggles et al. (2017)). Following the approach introduced by Collins
and Wanamaker (2017), I construct an occupational earnings score for each occupation-race-
gender-region cell based on its average 1940 income. This approach is similar in spirit to the
12Unlike contemporary dataset where there exists a unique personal identifier such as social security number, the
linking of historical datasets have to rely on time-invariant variables such as names and ages. However, due to errors
from census respondents, enumerators and digitization workers, information about names and ages are not always
accurate. Feigenbaum (2016) examines the matched sample from IPUMS and finds that the linked individuals have
birthyear difference less than 3 and name distance less than 0.2.
13Sampling from the initial sample to keep all possible matches for a given individual.
14False match rate represents the share of algorithm determined matches to be wrong; missed match rate represents
the share of true matches failed by the algorithm. Both inaccurate matches and selective linkages could have significant
effects on inference (Bailey et al. (2017)).
15A close comparison is Collins and Wanamaker (2017), where they use a different linking method to find southern-
residing males aged 0-17, residing with their father or stepfather, from 1910 to 1930. The reported match rate is 27
percent.
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OCCSCORE variable from IPUMS that is based on the median total income of all persons
with that particular occupation in 1950 (Ruggles et al. (2017)). It has, however, more flexibil-
ity to reflect differences by location, race, gender, and farm ownership.16 Most importantly,
the 1940 income matches more closely to my sample period than the 1950 income.
Specifically, because income for self-employed workers is not recorded in the 1940 census,
I first assign an imputed wage to self-employed as the average 1940 value for wage workers
multiplied by the ratio of one to the other in 1960. Then I construct an earnings score
for each occupation-race-gender-region cell by calculating the average earnings for everyone
with income information in 1940, including both wage earners and self-employed workers,
in that specific cell. Finally, I assign earnings scores to all individuals from both the 1910
census and the 1930 census based on their occupation, race, gender, and census division of
residence.
Using the national earnings score distribution as a reference, I convert the assigned
earnings score into percentile rank in each year (e.g., Collins and Wanamaker (2017); Chetty
et al. (2014)). The 1910 national sample includes all household heads (black and white)
with sons aged 0 to 17 in 1910. The 1930 national sample includes all black and white males
aged 20 to 37 in 1930. Rank is used because it allows a direct comparison of one’s economic
status to its peers.
2.3.3 Measuring Migration Inflow 1910-30
The census records an individual’s birthplace and place of residence at the census year.
However, migration status is not available before 1940. Therefore, I define a “southern black
migrant” as any black individual whose birthplace is in one of those 14 southern states
and whose place of residence is in the North. Since states are too heterogeneous to reveal
migration flows across labor markets, I examine migrant flows at the county level to focus
more directly on the relevant labor markets. The actual migration inflow (MI) is then
measured by the sum of changes in the total number of southern black migrants by state of
16Farmers’ earnings are imputed by the product of the average 1940 value in farm laborer cell and the 1960 earning
ratio of farmers over farm laborers. The ratio differs by gender and home ownership. Note that within cell differences
or changes in earnings cannot be observed.
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Between 1910 and 1930, the top 3 sending states are Georgia (195,999), South Carolina
(133,518), and Virginia (131,117); the top 3 receiving counties are Cook County in Illinois
(148,838), Wayne County in Michigan (94,672), and Philadelphia in Pennsylvania (90,741).18
Figure 2 Panel A displays a map of all the receiving counties in the North. It is clear from
the figure that migrants disproportionately settled in great urban centers.
2.3.4 Describing the Black Northerners in the Sample
While I have linked more than 24,000 individuals, only 12,623 were used in this analysis, all of
whom participated in the labor force in 1930.19 The sample counties are displayed in Figure
2 Panel B. Table 1 shows that the majority of black northerners stayed in their birth state in
1910, and very few of them lived on the farm. More than half of them were attending school;
almost one-third of them were considered as light-skinned blacks (enumerated as “mulatto”
in 1910 census); more than a fifth of them grew up in owner-occupied housing. They have a
relatively stable family structure, and their parents were predominantly literate.
Table 2 splits the sample into two groups for comparison. High-migration includes those
whose 1910 county of residence experienced above-median migration inflow. 1910 statistics
are based on characteristics of the household head, while 1930 statistics are based on adult-
hood outcomes of the linked black northerners. There is positive selection into the migration
destinations: both the employment and occupational earnings score were higher in high-
migration counties in 1910. The high-migration counties are also less agricultural oriented in
1910: less than 2% of the black northerners in high-migration counties were farmers, while
the share in low-migration counties is 16%. From 1910 to 1930, more black northerners en-
17I show in the Appendix that counties with migrants inflow were also destinations for northern black migrants.
Their correlation is higher than 0.95 and is significant at 1%.
18The corresponding cities are Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia.
19First, I lose around 30% (7,430) of the linked individuals by restricting the sample to counties that had southern-
born black residents in 1880 (discussed later) and migration inflow between 1910 and 1930. Then, I lose 3,998
individuals when restricting the sample to those in which they and their 1910 household head both had valid oc-
cupational information. Last, I lose 645 individuals by restricting the sample to counties where I have at least 10
observations.
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gaged in the non-agricultural sector. Among all the occupation categories, the share of black
northerners in the white-collar jobs saw the most significant expansion in high-migration
counties while the most significant increase for the unskilled jobs happened in low-migration
counties. Comparing between the two generations, an average black northerner’s absolute
economic standing is improving relative to its peers.20 In 1930, high-migration counties
were associated with lower employment and higher occupational earnings score for black
northerners.
2.4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In this section, I introduce the baseline estimating equation and construct an instrument for
migration inflow.
2.4.1 Baseline Estimating Equation
To systematically examine how in-migration affects employment outcomes of black north-
erners, I estimate
yics = α + βlogMIc +X
′
icsγ + δs + ics
where yics is either the binary variable for employment status or the percentile rank of
occupational earnings score in 1930; logMIc represents the natural log of migration inflow
between 1910 and 1930 for northern county c at where individual i lived in 1910;21 X
′
ics is
a vector of baseline controls measured in 1910 at the individual-, family-, and county-level
(specified below); δs is the 1910 state of residence fixed effect. The coefficient of interest,
β, thus relates the change in (log) migration inflow to the change in expected likelihood of
employment or expected occupational standing of black northerners across counties within
the same state. Standard errors are clustered at the county-level to reflect that northern-born
blacks growing up in the same county experienced the same level of migration shock.
20Peer to household head is defined as all the household head (black and white) with sons aged 0 to 17 in 1910;
Peer to sons is defined as all black and white males aged 20 to 37 in 1930.
21A binscatter plot of rank and migration inflow variable shows that the log transformation of migration inflow
exhibits a linear relationship with rank and the residual is normally distributed.
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The set of individual-level controls include skin color (light vs. dark skin), age, liter-
acy (measured by both “can read” and “can write”), school, migration status before 1910
(measured by whether living in the birth state in 1910); family-level controls include his
household head’s occupation percentile rank, literacy, marriage status, homeownership, farm
status, gender, age, and nativity; county-level controls include mean black earnings, total
and black population.
2.4.2 Instrument for Migration Inflow
The Great Migration did not accelerate until the WWI led to a labor demand boom in the
North. Since employment is fundamental to any migration decision, counties receiving more
black migrants could have more jobs offered to black workers to begin with. As we saw in
Table 2, high migration counties had better pre-migration labor markets. Therefore, the
comparison across high- and low-migration counties will be biased against finding any effect
on black northerners’ employment rates. While the OLS estimate for occupational standing
could be biased too, the likely direction of bias is unclear. It would be biased upward if
migrants were attracted to growing counties with better employment options. Alternatively,
the OLS results will be biased downward if migrants were selected into otherwise declining
counties that weren’t attracting foreign-born whites (Lemann (2011); Collins (1997)).
Although the inclusion of 1910 county characteristics listed above can account for selec-
tion to some degree, I construct a modified version of the shift-share instrument to further
mitigate the endogeneity concern of migration choice (Boustan (2009); Card (2001); Altonji
and Card (1991)). The instrument predicts the number of southern blacks received by north-
ern counties between 1910 and 1930 by interacting 1880 settlements of southern blacks in
the North with the pool of southern blacks “at risk” to migrate. This counterfactual mea-
sure indicates what the migration shock would have been if all the southern blacks aged
0-40 living in the South in 1910 had moved North. Literature suggests that younger blacks
are more likely to migrate because they experience smaller psychic costs and can collect
greater gains from migration over a longer period (Collins (1997); Higgs (1977); Long and
Heltman (1975)). Moreover, this birth cohort is the freed generations born after the Civil
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War who have developed a stronger sense of race consciousness and aspirations for social
justice. The intuition behind this instrument is that (1) blacks departing the South tended
to follow a settlement pattern that was similar to that of blacks who had left their state in
earlier decades, due to the stability of railway routes and enduring social networks; (2) the
stock of southern blacks from, for example, Mississippi in 1910 is unlikely to be influenced
by the labor market condition in Chicago after 1910, while the actual national-level outflow
from each southern state between 1910 and 1930 is more plausibly correlated with the local
economic conditions in common migration destinations.








where SB1880s,c is the total number of blacks from a southern state s living in the northern
county c in 1880; and SB1880s,North is the total number of blacks from state s in the North
in 1880. CS1910s,South is the cohort size of blacks aged 0-40 born in state s and living in the
South in 1910. Due to the log transformation, only the counties with a positive number of
southern black residents in 1880 and with a positive migration inflow between 1910 and 1930
are considered in this paper to have consistent sample size across regression analysis.
2.4.2.1 IV Power The instrument constructed in equation above exploits two sources
of variation in migration, which are not driven by other unobservable factors such as labor
demand conditions. The first one is the variation in demographic patterns in the South before
the migration (see Panel A in Figure 3), and the second one is the variation in the share
of southern blacks from each southern state living in different counties within a northern
state in 1880. Figure 3 Panel B presents an example of two primary receiving northern
states (Illinois and Pennsylvania) and two primary sending states (Georgia and Virginia) to
illustrate this variation.
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2.4.2.2 First Stage Results and Instrument Validity For all specifications, the F-
stat is very high, and the instrument has a large, positive, and significant effect on the actual
migrant change.22 It indicates that historical settlement patterns of southern blacks in the
North are useful in predicting migration destinations more than 30 years later. Given the
length of this lag, it is unlikely that the instrument is correlated with current labor demand
conditions. Nevertheless, I include white (both immigrant and native) population change in
the same county between 1910 and 1930 as a means of controlling for the potentially omitted
labor demand shocks. One may still be concerned that counties with larger southern black
migrants in 1880 were those having economic supremacy in 1880 and continued their reign
in the subsequent decades (Jaeger et al. (2018); Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018)). To
alleviate this concern, I also include 1880 county characteristics (i.e., the size of total and
black populations) in my preferred specification.
2.5 ESTIMATION RESULTS
In this section, I present my main results and a host of robustness checks.
2.5.1 Effects on Employment
In Panel A of Table 3, I study the effect of the Great Migration on black northerners’
likelihood of employment. I start with OLS: column 1 includes state fixed effect and a host
of individual-, family-, and county-level controls.23 The point estimate on migration inflow
is negative and statistically significant.
From column 2 onwards, I present 2SLS results. Column 2 replicates column 1, instru-
menting the migrants change with the modified shift-share instrument introduced in Section
2.4.2. As expected, the coefficient is now larger in magnitude and remained statistically
significant. Column 3 adds county characteristics in 1880 and the change of white popula-
22Full first stage results are reported in the Appendix.
23While it is a linear probability model, none of the predicted probabilities lie outside the unit interval. Horrace
and Oaxaca (2006) shows that, if no (or very few) predicted probabilities lie outside the unit interval then the LPM
is expected to be unbiased and consistent (or largely so).
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tion between 1910 and 1930. Its point estimate implies that a one standard deviation (2.38)
increase in the (log) migrant inflow decreases northern-born blacks’ employment rates by
2.86 percentage points, or 3.3% of the 1930 mean for a typical recipient county. In the larger
recipient county like Wayne, this effect amounts to 5.96 percentage points, or 6.87% of the
1930 mean when compared to its neighboring county Washtenaw.
To account for the possibility that in-migration may lead to an outflow of similarly
skilled northern blacks, I run the same specification on the stayers. The result in column 4
remains qualitatively in line with those reported in column 3 but become larger in magnitude,
confirming that displacement of northern blacks, if anything, attenuates the baseline results.
2.5.2 Effects on Occupational Standing
I next analyze the effect of the Great Migration on black northerners’ occupational standing,
measured by national percentile rank. As in Panel A, column 1 in Panel B reports OLS
results, while subsequent columns present 2SLS estimates. In all cases, the point estimate
is positive and statistically significant. Holding white population change and 1880 county
characteristics constant in column 3 does not substantially change the result, suggesting that
the different earnings created by the instrument flow were reasonably uncorrelated with the
labor demand factors. The inclusion of these two additional controls, however, is a more
rigorous way of accounting for potential spurious correlation between local economic activity
and the Great Migration, and thus delivers relatively more conservative estimates.
According to my preferred specification, reported in column 3, a one standard deviation
increase in (log) migration inflow raises northern-born working blacks’ occupational stand-
ing by approximately 1.33 percentile ranks, or by 3.96% relative to 1930 mean.24 By the
construction of the occupational earnings score, the northern-born black males in my sample
can increase their occupational earnings and thus percentile ranks by holding the same type
of jobs but moving to a higher-paid census division, or by obtaining higher-paid jobs within
the same division. The county where a northern-born black grew up does not necessarily
correspond to the county he lived in as an adult when I measured his occupational earnings
24Since we cannot observe within-cell wage change, the possibility that in-migration leads to lower black wages,
however, must still be borne in mind when interpreting any of the results.
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in 1930. The result from column 4 using the stayer sample voids the concern that outflow of
black northerners drives the impact of in-migration: the effect becomes substantially larger.
Therefore, in-migration creates opportunities for black northerners to obtain higher-paid
jobs.
The fact that 2SLS estimates are larger in magnitude than the OLS in both Panel A and
B implies that migrants were moving to counties with more jobs but with fewer opportunities
for skill upgrading.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
I use an alternative measure OCCSCORE that were used in many other studies for occu-
pational standing.25 All persons with the same occupation share the same OCCSCORE
regardless of his location. It is top coded at 80. The coefficients from a log-log regression
of OCCSCORE on migration inflow in Panel A of Table 4 are statistically significant at the
expected sign. The estimated elasticity is slightly larger than the one we obtained in Table 3
Panel C, probably because OCCSCORE fails to capture gaps by gender and home ownership
status within an occupation.26
The construction of an occupational earnings score assigns the same score to all persons
in the same occupational cell regardless of his employment status. Collins and Wanamaker
(2014) finds that “black men in the North who were unemployed at the time of enumeration
worked approximately 85 percent as many weeks in the previous year as those who were
employed at the time of enumeration” in 1930 using the IPUMS data. Therefore, as a
robustness check, I assign EarningsScoreb to everyone where the unemployed workers now
has only 85% of the earnings of the employed ones in the same occupational cell. Similar
results as to those in Panel A are obtained in Panel B of Table 4.
Rather than distributing the state-level outflow of southern blacks, I use the national
outflow of blacks from the South to the North to construct a different instrument flow
measure that is purely based on the variation in the share of southern blacks in the North in
1880. The estimated effects, presented in the Appendix, are qualitatively similar and slightly
25Examples see Table 1 in Saavedra and Twinam (2018), where a long list of published studies using OCCSCORE
is provided.




While the linked sample represents the initial linking sample overall, a few variables
exhibit statistically significant influence on the probability of linkage. In the Appendix, I
show that their presence did not bias my estimates: the weighted regressions deliver almost
the same results as the unweighted ones in Table 3. Therefore, all other results in this paper
are estimated based on the unweighted sample.
2.6 MECHANISMS
In this section, I offer support to the idea that black migrants serve as both competitors and
consumers to black northerners in the labor market. I also explore the heterogeneous effect
of the Great Migration, in an attempt to distinguish between winners and losers within black
northerners.
2.6.1 Competitors
Did counties that experienced a more substantial migrant influx have lower employment
rate for blacks to begin with? By comparing the employment status of their fathers in
1910, Figure 4 visually confirms that there is no significant difference in employment rates
across these counties before the migration. So then, why did black northerners from high
in-migration counties had significantly lower employment rate in 1930? Competition is one
obvious explanation since southern black migrants tend to work in the same types of jobs as
did the majority of the northern-born blacks when they enter the labor market in the North.
Given that southern black migrants were disproportionately unskilled workers, the com-
petition should have concentrated in the unskilled occupations. Suggestive evidence in Table
5 supports this argument: the negative effect of in-migration on the likelihood of employment
is imposed only on the unskilled northern black workers.27 On average, northern blacks with
skilled occupations have a higher employment rate than those who hold unskilled occupa-
27Note that a person in my sample is classified as an unskilled worker if IPUMS labeled his occupation as: operatives
and kindred workers; private household workers; service workers (except private household); farm laborers and
foremen; laborers (except farm and mine).
19
tions, and this discrepancy gets larger with in-migration since in-migration made only the
unskilled northern blacks to experience a greater risk of unemployment. Additionally, given
that the labor market was largely segregated by race, black migrants should have exerted
little to none competitive pressure on white workers. This is supported by the evidence
provided in column (5) to (8) of Table 5.28
The even higher unemployment rate for the stayers suggests that out-migration of black
northerners alleviate the competition pressure. Surprisingly, however, Figure 5 shows that
unskilled northern black workers from high in-migration counties are no more likely than their
counterparts from low in-migration counties to move out, reflecting the power of economic
opportunities in the high in-migration counties.
According to the simple supply and demand model, an influx of substitutable workers
constitutes an increase in the supply of labor, causing wages to fall for black workers with
similar skills. One potential difference between northern-born and southern-born blacks is
that they might have different reference points for fair pay. For example, southern migrants
tended to compare wages to what they would have expected in the South and accepted jobs
not taken by the northern-born blacks (Long and Heltman (1975); Broom and Glenn (1967)).
While wage changes within an occupation cannot be observed, northern-born blacks from
high in-migration counties should have been less likely to participate in the labor force if the
new wage scheme indeed discouraged them from working for what is not “respectable” pay.
However, I find no evidence in Table 6 that in-migration affects black northerners’ labor force
participation rates when expanding the sample to include those not in the labor force.29
2.6.2 Consumers
The positive effect on occupational standing estimated in Table 3 is consistent with a recent
body of the literature that documents a positive impact of immigrants on natives’ occu-
28I linked northern-born whites using the same approach described in the data section. Wright (1986) argues that
decades of occupational and industrial segregation had resulted in black and white workers occupying “noncompeting
jobs,” even at the entry level. Boustan (2009)) also provides evidence on racial segregation in employment within
skill groups.
29According to IPUMS, the labor force consists of all persons defined as “employed” or “unemployed”. Discour-
aged workers are considered not in the labor force. The 1930 census indicates whether or not a person filled out
an unemployment schedule. Every person in the EMPSTAT “unemployed” category completed an unemployment
schedule, regardless of whether or not they reported an occupation. Persons who did not report occupation and did
not fill out an unemployment schedule are in the EMPSTAT “not in the labor force” category.
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pational mobility (e.g., Tabellini (2017); Sequeira et al. (2017); Peri and Sparber (2009)).
Their intuition is that the complementarity between immigrants and natives induced the
latter to reallocate their labor from unskilled to skilled occupations, where they might have
a comparative advantage. In line with this, Table 7 shows that black northerners from high-
migration counties are more likely to become white-collar workers and less likely to become
unskilled workers.
What kind of white-collar jobs did they hold? In numbers, clerical workers take the
lead, followed by business and professional people and salesmen.30 How did they obtain
these white-collar jobs? One channel of entry, as mentioned in Section 2.2, is through
exerting political pressure on the public sector to create positions for blacks to serve the new
black communities.31 Another channel of entry is through conducting business that caters
to the black communities. Jobs such as funeral home owners and real estate agents were
accessible to potential entrepreneurs before the migration, but their economic variability
relies on its demographic base and intra-racial unity. The influx of migrants increased the
number of black consumers; at the same time, with migration further intensifying racial
discrimination, the ideology of black metropolis, racial solidarity, and self-help (black support
of black enterprise) was resurgence among the black elite. Therefore, both the number and
the types of black businesses and professionals are larger in high-migration counties.
Though migration expanded the demand for skilled labor, they did not remove all the
barriers that had previously thwarted black business development, such as lack of capital
and white support.32 Therefore, black northerners from the better-off economic background
would be more likely to be successful in these ventures. To test this hypothesis, I split
the sample by their skin color (light-skinned vs. darker-skinned) and by their fathers’ so-
cioeconomic status. Light-skinned blacks were more likely to have family resources, white
connections, and the ability to attract customers of both races, all of which would translate
30I group black business and professional people together because the line between them can sometimes be obscured.
For example, a dentist could be a professional who also owns the business. This group is what Talcott Parsons has
called the “market-oriented business group” (Trotter (1985)).
31However, they remained restricted to the least profitable and prestigious public positions such as mail carriers
and post office clerks.
32For example, C. L. Johnson in 1931 wanted to employ unemployed black men by establishing a car parking service
in downtown Milwaukee, but his plan was blocked by a hostile reaction from potential white customers. This example
highlighted the importance of white assistance in developing black enterprises as well as the narrowing opportunities
to build businesses catering mainly to whites (Trotter (1985)).
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into greater success in seizing the employment opportunities created by in-migration.33 A
person is classified into the low SES group if his father’s rank in 1910 below the median.
Results from Table 8 suggests that, indeed, in-migration had greater positive impact on the
occupational standing of mulattos and those from high SES families.
2.7 CONCLUSION
Peter Gottlieb (1987, p. 2) in his book, Making Their Own Way: Southern Blacks’ Migration
to Pittsburgh, 1916-30, wrote that “Southern blacks movement presaged lasting changes for
the migrants, and for racial practices and habits of mind at every level of American society.
Given the importance bestowed on blacks’ northward migration, it is surprising how little
we know about it.” Today, 30 years later, our knowledge of the Great Migration’s social
impact is still far from complete.
This paper contributes to a better understanding of how the Great Migration affects
the labor market outcomes of blacks who had been longstanding residents of the North.
Most importantly, this paper paints a nuanced picture, in which economically advantaged
northern blacks benefited from better opportunity while disadvantaged northern blacks saw
higher unemployment.
In contemporary America, blacks, as well as other minority groups, are often treated
as a monolithic or homogeneous group. The vast majority of the existing literature makes
the erroneous assumption that all blacks share the same experience and background. Little
studies explain how within-group heterogeneity affects the experiences of blacks and their
interactions with whites. This paper strengthens the importance of distinguishing blacks by
their regional origin, socioeconomic status, family backgrounds, and skin tone. To better
understand the experience of black Americans, future studies should not overlook critical
within-group differences, particularly those examining the link between race and disparities
in education, income, health, etc.
33Census in 1910 allowed individuals to be enumerated as black, white, or mixed. This trichotomous racial classi-
fication was abandoned in 1930 (Shertzer (2018)).
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2.8 FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Black and White County Median Occupational Earning Ratio in 1910 (Before
the Great Migration)
Notes: Occupational earnings is constructed by averaging 1940 income based on occupation-race-gender-region cell
(Collins and Wanamaker (2017)). States with thick border are defined as the South. Only counties with at least 50
blacks and whites are considered. Data divided into five quantiles with the top quantile further divided by value 1.
Source: Author’s calculations using IPUMS data (Ruggles et al. (2017)).
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Figure 2: Migration Inflow in Northern Counties Between 1910 and 1930
Panel A. All Counties
Panel B. Sample Counties
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Note: Estimated potential black migrants stock are computed by summing the total number of southern-born
blacks age 0-40 residing in one of the southern states by state of birth in the 1910 census year. Source:
Author's calculations using IPUMS data (Ruggles et al., 2015).
from Southern States, 1910
Variation in Estimated Black Migrant Stock
Panel B. Variation in Southern Black Settlement Within a
State, 1880
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Figure 4: Employment Rates and Migration Inflow
Notes: The figure presents a binned scatter plot, grouping northern-born blacks in the sample in (log) migration
inflow percentiles and plotting the share employed in the corresponding year. County-level characteristics and 1910
state of residence dummies are controlled. According to IPUMS, persons were considered employed if they were at
work on the reference day, which is the day the census was taken for 1910 and the previous regular working day for
1930.
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Figure 5: Share of Unskilled Movers vs. Migration Inflow
Notes: The figure presents a binned scatter plot, grouping movers in the sample in (log) migration inflow
percentiles and plotting the share of movers who are unskilled workers within each group. Individual-, family-,
county-level characteristics, and 1910 state of residence dummies are controlled.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Black Northerners, 1910
VARIABLES Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
Panel A. Individual Characteristics
Age 12,623 7.755 5.068 0 17 7
Mulatto 12,623 0.300 0.458 0 1 0
Attending School 12,623 0.538 0.499 0 1 1
Stayed in Birth State 12,623 0.936 0.245 0 1 1
In Owner-occupied Housing 12,623 0.229 0.420 0 1 0
Live on Farm 12,623 0.085 0.278 0 1 0
Panel B. Head of Household Characteristics
Age 12,623 40.15 9.451 18 91 39
Literate 12,623 0.848 0.359 0 1 1
Married 12,623 0.908 0.289 0 1 1
Mulatto 12,623 0.261 0.439 0 1 0
Female 12,623 0.091 0.287 0 1 0
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by the Degree of Migration Inflow
VARIABLES
All High-Migration Low-Migration
1910 1930 1910 1930 1910 1930
Employed 0.956 0.867 0.957 0.857 0.954 0.876
Occupational Earnings Score 694.1 777.7 731.2 817.3 657.4 738.4
Percentile Rank 29.58 33.49 32.25 36.20 26.94 30.81
Occupation Categories
White-collar Jobs 0.072 0.129 0.098 0.169 0.046 0.089
Blue-collar Jobs 0.053 0.073 0.057 0.075 0.049 0.070
Unskilled Jobs 0.786 0.783 0.828 0.750 0.744 0.816
Farmers 0.089 0.015 0.017 0.006 0.161 0.025
Obs. 12,623 6,280 6,343
29
Table 3: Migration and Black Northerners’ Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. Prob. of Employment
(log) Mig. Inflow -0.006** -0.013* -0.012** -0.027***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Mean DV 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.864
Panel B. Percentile Rank
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.421*** 0.603** 0.556** 1.293***
(0.143) (0.275) (0.252) (0.460)
Mean DV 33.49 33.49 33.49 33.97
Panel C. (log) EarningsScorea
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.008*** 0.014** 0.013** 0.030**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012)
Mean DV 6.614 6.614 6.614 6.624
Controls:
White Pop Change X X
County Characteristics 1880 X X
Stayer Only X
Observations 12,623 12,623 12,623 7,234
County 151 151 151 149
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 30.96 41.59 34.42
county cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions include individual-level, family-level and county-level controls, as well
as state fixed effects.
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Table 4: Alternative Measures for Occupational Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. (log) Occscore
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.013*** 0.022** 0.022*** 0.039***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014)
Mean DV 2.953 2.953 2.953 2.961
Panel B. (log) EarningsScoreb
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.007** 0.012** 0.011** 0.025**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011)
Mean DV 6.592 6.592 6.592 6.601
Controls:
White Pop Change X X
County Characteristics 1880 X X
Stayer Only X
Observations 12,623 12,623 12,623 7,234
County 151 151 151 149
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 30.96 41.59 34.42
county cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions include individual-level, family-level and county-level controls, as well
as state fixed effects.
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Table 5: Migration and Prob. of Employment by Skill Level
Northern-born Blacks Northern-born Whites
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. Unskilled Workers
(log) Mig. Inflow -0.009*** -0.015** -0.015** -0.032*** 0.008* 0.006 0.006 0.015
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
Mean DV 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.853 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.887
Observations 9,918 9,918 9,918 5,718 3,908 3,908 3,908 2,242
County 150 150 150 148 128 128 128 118
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 33.19 44.02 35.86 26.06 37.92 31.95
Panel B. Skilled Workers
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.010 -0.001 0.005 0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.020) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Mean DV 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.903 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.917
Observations 2,705 2,705 2,705 1,516 6,822 6,822 6,822 3,916
County 145 145 145 123 128 128 128 128
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 18.22 28.86 19.52 22.44 29.94 23.90
Controls:
White Pop Change X X X X
County Characteristics 1880 X X X X
Stayer Only X X
county cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Following definition in Ferrie (1996), unskilled includes operatives and kindred workers; private household
workers; service workers, except private household; farm laborers and foremen; laborers, except farm and mine.
All regressions include individual-level, family-level and county-level controls, as well as state fixed effects.
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Table 6: Migration and Labor Force Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Mean DV 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.918
Observations 13,837 13,837 13,837 7,884
County 151 151 151 150
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 31.02 41.96 35.71
Controls:
White Pop Change X X
County Characteristics 1880 X X
Stayer Only X
county cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The same set of counties from Table 3 are used in the white sample. A few
counties are dropped because they do not have linked white residents or did not
pass the sample restriction. All regressions include individual-level, family-level
and county-level controls, as well as state fixed effects.
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Table 7: Probability of Black Northerners Holding Certain Occupation in 1930
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White Collar Blue Collar Unskilled Farmer
Panel A. OLS Estimates
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.005** -0.002 -0.005 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Panel B. 2SLS Estimates
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.012** 0.003 -0.013** -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Mean DV 0.129 0.073 0.783 0.015
Observations 12,623 12,623 12,623 12,623
County 151 151 151 151
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 41.59 41.59 41.59 41.59
Controls:
White Pop Change X X X X
County Characteristics 1880 X X X X
county cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Following definition in Ferrie (1996), white collar workers are professional, technical, and kindred
workers; managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm; clerical and kindred workers; sales workers; blue
collar workers includes craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers; unskilled workers includes operatives and
kindred workers; private household workers; service workers, except private household; farm laborers and
foremen; laborers, except farm and mine; farmer includes farmers and farm managers (including farm tenants).
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Table 8: Migration and Rank by Skin Color and Father’s SES Status
Skin Color SES Status
Dark Light Low High
Panel A. OLS Estimates
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.399** 0.525** 0.306** 0.552**
(0.171) (0.257) (0.154) (0.219)
Panel B. 2SLS Estimates
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.493* 0.972** 0.279 0.925**
(0.286) (0.435) (0.258) (0.450)
Mean DV 32.27 36.34 30.44 35.88
Observations 8,832 3,791 5,541 7,082
County 150 141 150 147
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 46.10 19.95 29.58 41.57
Panel C. 2SLS Estimates (Stayer Only)
(log) Mig. Inflow 1.073** 2.000** 0.896* 1.962***
(0.504) (0.830) (0.483) (0.608)
Mean DV 32.48 37.25 29.81 36.75
Observations 4,969 2,265 2,893 4,341
County 147 124 140 135
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 39.08 14.11 26.59 29.31
county cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions include individual-level, family-level and county-level (including white
population change and 1880 county characteristics) controls, as well as state fixed effects.
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3.0 RACIAL SEGREGATION IN HOUSING MARKETS
AND THE EROSION OF BLACK WEALTH
(With Prottoy A. Akbar, Allison Shertzer, and Randall P. Walsh)
“Daisy and Bill Myers, the first black family to move into Levittown, Pennsylvania, were
greeted with protests and a burning cross. A neighbor who opposed the family said that Bill
Myers was ‘probably a nice guy, but every time I look at him I see $2,000 drop off the value of
my house.”’
-Ta-Nehisi Coates, We Were Eight Years in Power: An American Tragedy (2018)
“During the early nineteen twenties it is estimated that more than 200,000 Negroes migrated to
Harlem... It was a typical slum and tenement area little different from many others in New
York except for the fact that in Harlem rents were higher... Before Negroes inhabited them,
they could be let for virtually a song. Afterwards, however, they brought handsome incomes.”
-Frank Boyd, American Life Histories Manuscripts (WPA Federal Writers’ Project, 1938)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Housing is the most important asset for the vast majority of American households and a key
driver of racial disparities in wealth (Blau and Graham (1990), Wolff (2014), Aladangady et
al. (2017)). Social scientists have long hypothesized that racial income inequality reproduces
itself in housing wealth, with minority groups who face discrimination in the labor market
less able to build equity in their homes. This process yields impoverished neighborhoods
that impede the health, educational attainment, and upward mobility of the next generation
of black children (Ananat (2011); Wilson (2012); Chetty et al. (2014)). In this narrative,
segregated neighborhoods harm the socioeconomic standing of their residents through a
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complex system of interrelated disadvantages.
Recent scholarship and public discourse has focused on how discrimination in credit
markets served to exacerbate forces operating in labor markets and educational systems
to limit black accumulation of housing wealth.1 Far less attention has been paid to the
direct role that segregated housing markets played in sapping black households of resources
and inhibiting their ability to accumulate assets. Using a novel dataset of rents, home
values, and the racial composition of city blocks in prewar American cities, we examine the
distinct disadvantages faced by black households due to the establishment and expansion of
segregated neighborhoods. We find that rental prices and occupancy rates soared when city
blocks transitioned from all white to majority black. Further, when black families were able
to escape these escalated rents through the purchase of their own home, these same market
dynamics led to the erosion of their homes’ value.
The history of racial transition in twentieth century American neighborhoods contains
many references to “blockbusting,” the process by which the black ghetto expanded into for-
merly white neighborhoods (Massey and Denton (1993)). Black families, who were desperate
for quality housing, would outbid whites for apartments and homes outside but typically ad-
jacent to the existing ghetto. Furthermore, because blacks were willing to pay a premium
relative to whites for even substandard housing, formerly single-family homes could be sub-
divided to accommodate more residents. As highlighted by the two passages that begin this
paper, the fact blacks paid higher rents stands in stark contrast to an expectation that hous-
ing prices would fall as the block transitioned. Popular accounts of the day focus extensively
on the latter process and the concerns of white homeowners who expected their property
to lose substantial value once black families began settling nearby.2 These concerns fueled
a white exodus to neighborhoods safe from the threat of black encroachment (Mehlhorn
(1998), Boustan (2010)).
At first glance, the notion that racial transition could be associated with both increases
1A key focus of this work has been the role of redlining by both private lenders and federal agencies, namely
the Federal Housing Authority. For instance, see Aaronson et al. (2017). Ta-Nehisi Coates cites redlining as an
example of the type of government policy that deliberately inhibited the wealth accumulation of black families in his
well-known essay “The Case for Reparations” in the Atlantic (2014).
2A recent theory paper (Ouazad (2015)) models blockbusting as a problem in which fee-motivated real estate
agents trade off a decline in property values associated with black entry with an increase in commissions due to
higher turnover. We cannot observe the actions of real estate agents in our setting and thus restrict our attention to
prices in the housing market.
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in aggregate rental prices and decreases in property values poses a puzzle. Indeed, to our
knowledge, no existing empirical papers argue that the arrival of black residents caused the
prices of owned and rented housing to diverge. To understand the mechanisms that could
generate such a finding, we consider the capitalization rate that is implied by a no arbitrage
condition between rents and home values (Kearl (1979); Poterba (1992)). Here, we formalize
the capitalization rate as the percent of a propertys value that must be received as rent each
year to make an investor indifferent between holding the asset and receiving rent and selling
the property at its market value. Under the no arbitrage condition, all else equal, a real
estate investor must be compensated by higher rents today if she is to purchase a property
whose price is expected to fall in future periods. Similarly, expectations of high maintenance
costs or more rapid rates of physical deterioration would require higher rents as well.
The causal effect of racial transition on rental and home prices is difficult to identify
because the ghetto tended to expand endogenously into areas populated by older residents
and with lower quality housing. Accordingly, our empirical approach addresses the concern
that black families may have been allowed to move into blocks where home prices would have
fallen even in the absence of racial transition. To facilitate the identification of the causal
impact of racial transition on prices, we match the universe of household addresses from ten
major northern cities across the 1930 and 1940 federal censuses to create a panel dataset of
single-family homes and apartment buildings. The 1930 and 1940 censuses were the first to
ask about home values and rents, and the expiration of census confidentiality rules enables
us to observe the same address in both years, along with a reported rent or valuation and
the race of the occupants.
This panel dataset provides several avenues for causal identification of the racial transi-
tion effect on home prices. First, to minimize the potential for omitted variable bias related
to where black families already lived, our baseline sample consists of city blocks that were all
white in 1930. We further restrict our attention to addresses that were single-family, owner-
occupied homes at the start of the decade. Importantly, with our linked sample, we can
use 1930 price as a proxy for all time-consistent unobserved address-level characteristics in a
1940 cross-sectional analysis. Linking also allows us to control for the 1930 occupancy rate
and a set of city block-level characteristics such as the rental rate. In our preferred specifi-
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cation, we also include fixed effects for the enumeration district (a geographic area typically
comprising less than four city blocks). Identification thus relies on variation in block-level
racial transition within these narrowly defined neighborhoods that cannot be predicted by
1930 housing value, occupancy rate or city block-level rental share.
Impacts of racial transition are large. We find that rental prices and occupancy soared
by 40 percent in blocks that transitioned from all white to majority black. In contrast,
home values fell by 10 percent relative to blocks that remained all white. Further analysis
suggests that increases in occupancy in homes on transitioning blocks were a key mechanism
underlying these declines in value. When we focus our analysis solely on homes that saw
both increases in occupancy and block-level racial transition, the estimated decline in price
increases to 28 percent. In contrast, we observe sharp increases in rental prices for all houses
on transitioning blocks, whether occupancy increased or not. Summarizing the impact of
racial transition on the relationship between rents and prices, we estimate that the capital-
ization rate on blocks that became majority black was about 17 percent, compared with 11
percent on blocks that remained white.
Black families bore the brunt of both shifts in prices. When we decompose the fall in
home prices by the racial composition of the block and race of the homeowner, we find that
the prices fell the most during the beginning of the transition process, when black arrivals
tended to be better off and were more likely to buy their home. On the other hand, rental
prices increased the most after the block attained majority black status and black arrivals
were typically poorer renters. Furthermore, rents only increased for black families, not
white families who remained during the transition process. Finally, we document significant
heterogeneity across cities with those cities that saw the largest inflows of black migrants
(e.g. Chicago, Philadelphia and Detroit) experiencing the largest rent and price impacts from
racial transition. In these cities, capitalization rates in blocks that transitioned to majority
black exceeded 20 percent and home values on these blocks dropped by a staggering 50
percent over the first decade of transition.
Our findings have important implications for understanding racial disparities in wealth.
Because of the segregated housing market in American cities, black families faced dual barri-
ers to wealth accumulation: they paid more in rent for similar housing while simultaneously
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experiencing declining values of the homes they were able to purchase. The economically
significant amount of wealth erosion endured by black families in the northern housing mar-
ket nuances our understanding of the Great Migration, which is a key channel through which
African Americans were able to improve their economic standing in prewar America (Myrdal
(1944), Collins and Wanamaker (2014)). The cumulative gains in occupational standing and
earnings achieved by black families may have been largely canceled out by segregated housing
markets.
Meanwhile, real estate investors faced such large demand from black renter households
desperate for housing outside of the already dilapidated ghetto that they were able to charge
sufficiently high rental prices to overcome the expected losses due to future declines in the
value of their capital. Investor pessimism was highly racialized, and we see no similar declines
in housing values on blocks that saw large increases in occupancy yet remained white. The
large gaps in capitalization rates that we document in this paper provide strong evidence that
as of 1940, the market was already anticipating that homeowners in black neighborhoods
would see their wealth severely eroded by housing market forces over the coming years.
3.2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
3.2.1 Historical Background
The Great Migration saw millions of African Americans leave the poverty and oppression of
the Jim Crow South for better lives in northern cities. However, they soon discovered that
the North maintained its own system of racial segregation, particularly in housing markets.
Black families found themselves largely restricted to homes in the existing black ghetto
through a mixture of threats, actual violence, and discriminatory real estate practices. The
narrative history emphasizes collective action taken by whites to maintain the color line,
which shifted over time from angry mobs in the early days of the Great Migration to the
later establishment of genteel neighborhood “improvement” associations (Massey and Denton
(1993)). Such associations were created in part to lower the costs of adopting restrictive
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covenants, which were deed provisions prohibiting the sale of a house to a black family. Such
covenants had effect until 1948 when the Supreme Court struck down their enforcement in
Buchanan v. Warley.
Still, the color line was not inviolate. The 1920s and 1930s saw significant expansions
of the ghetto in most northern cities. Urban historians underscore the desperation of black
families for better housing and their tendency to outbid whites for homes near the ghetto. On
the other hand, real estate professionals and academics were united in their belief that black
entry would harm home values.3 Such expectations made banks reluctant to underwrite
a mortgage for a “pioneer” black family entering a white neighborhood where the lending
institution already held loans. One historian summarized the dichotomy thusly:
“One of the most interesting points made in the [real estate] broker comments is the re-
curring theme that while sellers may not get their price from whites (who are reluctant
to consider an area undergoing racial transition), they probably can from nonwhites. This
is quite different from the unqualified prediction that all prices in an ‘invaded’ area fall”
(Laurenti (1960), p. 20).
The fact that the ghetto expanded even though black families tended to have fewer assets
to use for a down payment suggests that some banks did in fact underwrite mortgages for
them. While banks were typically reluctant to initiate racial transition on a block, they
appear willing to have made loans in neighborhoods “destined” to turn. Surveys of real
estate brokers from the period suggest that the first family to enter a white neighborhood
often sought a mortgage from a distant bank that did not have exposure to the area in
question (Schietinger (1953), p. 172). The narrative history on the issue of mortgage terms
is mixed, with some surveys finding blacks and whites received similar terms (Rapkin and
Grigsby (1960), p. 77) and other scholars arguing that African American borrowers were
steered towards installment contracts where they could be lose possession of their home if
they were late on a single payment (Satter (2009), p. 4).
Of course, not all black families bought their own home. As we discuss below, we find
that the proportion of renters increased throughout the transition process. The question
of who owned properties rented out to black families is thus important for interpreting our
3Some social scientists had a more nuanced view of the process. For instance, Gunnar Myrdal argued in An
American Dilemma that white racism was the primary cause of drops in home values as a block began transitioning
and that prices should recover once the neighborhood was majority black (p. 623).
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results. The census does not allow us to observe the identity of property owners in the case
where the occupants are renters. We thus turn to the narrative history, which suggests white
investors purchased properties in the black ghetto with the perhaps self-fulfilling expectation
that their investment would sharply depreciate over time.4 Real estate brokers believed that
houses that were converted to multi-family rentals would lose value over time and were
generally unwilling to make loans for the purchase of such properties (McEntire (1960), ch.
xiii). It would thus be necessary to buy these properties with cash. It is also likely the
case that some landlords were simply household heads who decided to rent out the former
family home instead of selling. Both considerations underscore the fact that in our setting
the owners of rental properties were most-likely white.
3.2.2 Related Literature in Economics
A large body of work in economics and related fields seeks to understand the causes and
consequences of segregated housing markets. Of particular interest is the question of how
preferences for racial residential segregation is manifested in housing prices. The consensus
in the literature is that segregation that arises from constraints on black housing supply will
result in black families paying higher prices for similar housing relative to whites. Indeed,
most papers that examine racial housing price disparities between 1940 and 1970 have argued
that blacks paid such a premium (King and Mieszkowski (1973); Yinger (1975); Schafer
(1979)). The passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 reduced the tools available to white
families to maintain the color line, and most papers working with data from after 1970
argue that segregation was maintained by whites paying a premium to avoid black neighbors
(Follain and Malpezzi (1981); Chambers (1992)).
Yet establishing that black and white families paid different amounts for the same quality
of housing is extraordinarily difficult. Much of the research on such differentials in the
years after the Fair Housing Act was passed necessarily compares housing in very different
neighborhoods because so many whites had already moved to the suburbs. The seminal
paper on this topic is Cutler et al. (1999), which proposes an indirect empirical test of the
4See for instance United States Congress House Committee on the District of Columbia, 1935, Rent Commission:
Hearings before the subcommittee on Fiscal Affairs on H.R. 3809, p. 7.
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hypothesis that segregation generates price premia. They note that the black main effect on
rental price is negative in every period they study, from 1940 to 1990, likely due to unobserved
differences in housing quality. The authors thus draw inference from the interaction between
black household and measured racial segregation in a particular city: a positive interaction
term is then interpreted as evidence that blacks paid more for housing in segregated cities,
hinting at the existence of supply constraints, while a negative interaction suggests that
whites pay a premium. Interpreting estimates of these interaction terms, Cutler Glaeser
and Vigdor conclude that blacks paid a premium in the 1940s and whites a premium by the
1990s.
In any case, the finding that the typical black family paid a premium for housing circa
1940 is difficult to square with the anecdotal literature on the impact of racial transition on
property values in the early to mid-twentieth century. The history of the Great Migration
makes many references to the supposed deleterious impact of black arrivals on home values
in northern cities. The FHA underwriting manual emphasized maintaining the racial com-
position of neighborhoods for this reason (FHA, 1936). In any case, it remains necessary to
reconcile the potential drop in property values associated with pre-Fair Housing Act black
in-migration with the black rental premium found in other work.
Economists have recently dedicated a great deal of attention to government involvement
in housing markets that may have had a discriminatory impact, particularly “redlining”
in mortgage insurance (for instance, see Aaronson et al. (2017)). Beginning in 1934, the
Federal Housing Authority initiated underwriting mortgages and imposed policies that would
disadvantage black neighborhoods in central cities. However, FHA underwriting was still a
nascent process during our sample period, particularly so in the extant neighborhoods that
we study. As of the end of 1940, the FHA had underwritten only 60,339 mortgages on
existing homes in the metropolitan areas of the cities we study in this paper.5 Further,
federal urban renewal policies did not begin until the 1949 Housing Act (Collins and Shester
(2013); LaVoice, 2018). It is thus unlikely that federal government policies can explain the
5These numbers come from the FHA’s Annual report for 1940 (FHA, 1941). We have been unable to identify
exactly how large the metropolitan areas were for this reported data. However, as an example, the FHA reported more
homes insured in the New York City Metropolitan area than it reported for the entire state of New York, suggesting
that they used broad metropolitan area definitions. Thus, this number should likely be viewed as a conservative
upper bound. In which case, FHA penetration into our sample would still have been quite limited as of 1940 (likely
on the order of 2 to 4 percent).
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findings of this paper. Instead, the FHA and subsequent federal policies likely served to
institutionalize and reinforce the private market dynamics that we document.
Our paper is also related to the literature on white flight from central cities. A number of
researchers have investigated the population dynamics associated with neighborhood racial
turnover starting with the Schelling (1971) model of neighborhood tipping. Card et al. (2008)
explored the existence of neighborhood tipping in the late twentieth century. Other scholars
have explored white flight from black arrivals more generally, for instance Boustan (2010)
for the postwar period and Shertzer and Walsh (2016) for the prewar period. We diverge
from this literature by considering the economic toll of white flight on the black families who
were left behind.
3.3 DATA
For this paper we construct a novel dataset composed of the universe of addresses in ten
major cities matched across the 1930 and 1940 censuses. The sample cities are Baltimore,
Boston, the Brooklyn and Manhattan boroughs of New York, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Detroit, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. To create the set of addresses matched
over time, we have developed an algorithm in the spirit of the individual matching literature
(Long and Ferrie (2013); Feigenbaum (2016); Bailey et al. (2017)). However, while similar
in many ways to the process of matching individuals across time, in matching addresses we
are also able to leverage three additional sources of information to improve our accuracy:
the structure of the census manuscripts, digitized historical street files and neighborhood
geography. Our basic approach is as follows:
1. We first assign every individual living in one of our sample cities in either 1930 or 1940
an address that is consistent across all household members. If an address is missing, we
impute it using another member of the household (households with inconsistent addresses
are dropped).
2. We standardize street names to deal with variations of directional prefixes and typical
suffixes (“First” vs. “1st”, “st” vs. “Street”). We cross-reference street names using a
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digitized street file for each city: if there is no corresponding street in the neighborhood
in the spatial data, we drop everyone with an address on that street from the census
data.
3. We conduct a series of consistency checks to identify the types of errors and omissions
that are common in the address field, including making sure neighbors on the same street
have addresses that change monotonically as we move down a manuscript page.
4. We retain only observations on streets that pass our quality checks and have no address
inconsistencies.
5. We merge across the 1930 and 1940 census on our standardized street names and house
numbers, yielding a sample of both single-family homes and apartment buildings.
Our algorithm is conservative in that we discard everyone associated with a particular
address and everyone associated with an adjacent address on the manuscript when there is
a potential problem with the census data, minimizing the risk of missing true occupants of
a particular address in our final dataset. Because we wish to examine both occupancy rates
and prices in our matched sample, developing an accurate count of household members is
essential. Further details of the address data construction can be found in the Data Appendix
B. Our final sample contains 591,780 unique addresses that could be located in both 1930
and 1940 from about 100,000 city-blocks across the sample cities (see Appendix Tables B1
and B2).6 We have on average 10 to 15 addresses per city-block, depending on the city.
We compare addresses that could be cleaned and matched to the universe of addresses in
Appendix Table B3. There is some evidence that addresses with fewer occupants were more
likely to be matched although the differences are economically small.7
In previous work, we constructed fine-grained, spatially-identified demographic data for
neighborhoods in ten of the largest northern cities for 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930 (Shertzer
et al. (2016)). For this project we have expanded this data forward to 1940, and, using
GIS software, created neighborhoods that are comparable over time across these two years.
6To obtain the final address-level dataset, we trim outliers that are likely transcription errors or records associated
with institutionalized individuals. In particular, we drop any households with more than 10 members, any household
with more than three heads, any addresses with monthly rent greater than $100, and any addresses with a value
greater than $20,000.
7For instance, there were 7.51 individuals per address in the universe of addresses compared with 6.81 individuals
on average in our matched addresses. Because of the large sample size, nearly every difference in Appendix Table B3
is statistically significant.
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We are thus able to measure a relatively broad set of neighborhood characteristics at a
small unit of geography, specifically at the level of the 1930 census enumeration district
(typically around four city blocks in urban areas). Using our address data, we are further
able to measure racial composition and other key variables at the city-block level. Blocks
are delineated using postal service convention with street number intervals in the hundreds.
For purposes of identification, our empirical work relies primarily on a sample of single-
family, owner-occupied homes located on blocks that were at least 95 percent white in 1930.
We thus present summary statistics for this sample in Table 9, subdividing the sample by
whether the block had begun undergoing racial transition or not (defined as having at least
10 percent black population in 1940). We first note the enormous drop in nominal home
prices that accompanied the Great Depression, with homes in all blocks losing about 40
percent of their value between 1930 and 1940. Blocks that transitioned started with slightly
lower average values relative to homes on blocks that did not transition ($5999 versus $6296,
respectively).
The basic findings of this paper are evident in the 1940 values of homes that remained
owned and rents of homes that switched being rental properties. Although homes on blocks
that transitioned were cheaper in 1930 and lost proportionally more value over the next
decade, average rents on these blocks were higher relative to homes on blocks that remained
white ($38.95 versus $35.44, respectively). At the same time, homes on blocks that tran-
sitioned gained more occupants while homes on blocks that remained white actually saw
occupancy decrease between 1930 and 1940.
Finally, to preview our basic findings and provide a visual treatment of the underlying
dynamics in our data, Figures 7 and 8 present the semiparametric relationship between
racial transition and rents and home prices estimated using the Robinsons double residual
method (Robinson (1988)). The figures are based on our baseline matched sample of homes
that were single family, owner occupied and located on a block that was at least 95 percent
white in 1930. They visualize the non-parametric relationship between the level of racial
transition as of 1940 (horizontal axis) and rent or price in 1940 (vertical axis), controlling
parametrically for a full set of controls including the homes value in 1930.8 We begin by
8That is, we estimate lnPricei40 = X’β + (Black sharei40) + i where Xi includes controls for occupancy at the
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showing the relationship between 1940 black share and log rent in Figure 7. Log rent (for
houses that switched to being rentals) is flat for low black shares but then swells 30 log
points, reflecting an increase of 35 percent, between 50 and 90 percent black share.
We now turn from rents to sales prices. If racial market dynamics are driven solely by
supply pressures in the market for black housing, i.e. owing to the enforcement of segregated
neighborhoods, we would expect the value of owner-occupied homes in black neighborhoods
to experience similar increases in valuations upon racial transition. Yet, Figure 8 shows that
home values in transitioned neighborhoods actually declined by 10 log points, or about 11
percent. When we decompose this relationship by the race of the owner, we see that both
racial groups saw their homes lose value but that black families saw a larger decline over the
range of black share. The primary goals of our empirical work are to ascertain whether these
relationships are causal and to better understand the divergence between rents and owner
occupied housing prices.
3.4 EMPIRICAL APPROACH
To these goals, our empirical framework models the relationship between rents, property
values, and the racial composition of neighborhoods from the perspective of an arbitraging
real estate investor. To fix ideas, we denote the price (rent or own) of and individual building
as follows:
Pi =
annual renti, if tenure = rsalei, if tenure = 0
For a given owner occupied house, its price in year t is given by:
Pit = ct ∗ ρt ∗Q(Zi)
where ρt is the city-specific price level at time t, Zi is a vector of housing and neighborhood
characteristics that are particular to the given house, Q(.) is a quantity function that maps
address level, share renters and total number of addresses at the block level, and share black, share immigrant, share
laborer, mean age, median home value, median rent, and median occupational score at the neighborhood level.
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these characteristics into a unidimensional measure of service flow, and ct is a capitalization
rate that captures the equilibrium relationship between sales price and annual rent.
We follow Poterba (1992) in conceptualizing the capitalization rate as follows:
rentit = ct ∗ saleit
where ct = i + τp + risk+maintenance + depreciation - appreciation and i is the interest
rate and τp captures the relevant property taxes. Intuitively, the real estate investor scales
the value of the property asset by a factor that takes into account the interest rate, prop-
erty taxes, the risk premium associated with owning the property, costs for maintaining
the property, expected depreciation, and appreciate net of the overall inflation rate. The
capitalization rate thus captures the overall impact of these factors.
By combining the two equations above, we can derive a unified expression for Pit:
Pit = ρt ∗ cIrentt ∗Q(Zi)
where Irent is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the house is rented. Taking logs of both
sides yields the following:
lnPit = lnρt + lnct ∗ Irent + q(Zi)
where, q(Zi) = lnQ(Zi). For convenience, we will refer this equation as (1) below. In
our application, we don’t directly observe characteristics Zi, but we do observe prices in
both 1940 and 1930 and can use this information to effectively control for these unobserved
characterizations.
Solving the 1930 iteration of equation (1) for q(Zi) = lnPit− lnρt− lnct ∗Irent. Assuming
that Zi is time invariant, limiting our sample to houses that were owner occupied in 1930
(we relax both of these restrictions later) and substituting this expression back into the 1940
version of equation (1) yields the following expression for 1940 prices:
lnPi40 = lnρ40 − lnρ30 + lnPit + lnct40 ∗ Irent40
Thus, ignoring neighborhood racial transition for the moment, we have the following model:
lnPi40 = α + β ∗ Irent40 + γlnPi30 + i
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we can interpret the key coefficients in this equation as follows: α is the difference in the
(logged) price levels between 1940 and 1930 and β is the logged capitalization rate in 1940.
Further, inclusion of the 1930 house price effectively controls for all time-invariant house and
neighborhood characteristics.9
To build on this basic empirical specification, we begin by limiting our sample to houses
located on city blocks that were less than 5 percent black in 1930. We then generate an
indicator variable for racial transition that we set equal to 1 if the block was more than 10
percent black in 1940. We then add the transition variable and its interaction with the rent
indicator to the previous equation yielding our basic specification:
lnPi40 = α + βtrans ∗ Itransi + βrent ∗ Irenti + βtransXrent ∗ ItransXrenti + γlnPi30 + i
In this specification, exp(βˆtrans) provides an estimate of the percent difference in sales prices
between blocks that transitioned and those that did not. Further, exp(βˆtrans+βˆtransXrent)
provides an estimate of the percent difference in rental prices across transitioning and non-
transitioning blocks.10
Finally, we note that certain characteristics of houses (or their neighborhoods) might
change in systematic ways between 1930 and 1940. We control for this possibility in two
separate ways. First, we directly include controls for a number of 1930 characteristics at the
address, block, and neighborhood level that may be predictive of these systematic changes.
Specifically, we control for the occupancy at the address level, share renters and total number
of addresses at the city-block level, and finally at the neighborhood level we control for share
black, share immigrant, share laborer, mean age, median home value, median rent, and
median occupational score. Second, we drop the neighborhood-level controls (keeping the
house and city-block-level controls) and instead include ED-level fixed effects. These fixed
effects will absorb any time changing characteristics that are shared at the ED-level (recall
that EDs in our sample are typically approximately four city blocks).
9One could restrict the coefficient γ to be equal to 1. However, not doing so allows for the possibility that price
deflation between 1930 and 1940 varied across the distribution of housing quantities.
10By including additional indicator variables and interaction terms, equation (7) can be extended to provide a richer
characterization of market dynamics across a broader range of racial transitions. Further, βˆrent and βˆtransXrent allow




We begin our analysis of blockbusting by relating the change in the block-level racial com-
position to changes in housing prices over the 1930s. First, we illustrate the relationship
between black share in 1930 and 1940 in Figure 6. Any non-zero black population share
in 1930 was associated with large increases in black population share over the next decade,
suggesting that any “tipping point” (Schelling (1971); Card et al. (2008)) in this context is
very low. Thus, to reduce concern about omitted variable bias arising from neighborhoods
that had already transitioned, in all subsequent work we restrict our sample to blocks that
were still at least 95 percent white in 1930.
For our baseline specification, we consider the impact of city block-level racial change as
measured by a variable that equals one if a formerly white block became majority black by
1940 and 0 otherwise. Column (1) of Panel A in Table 10 reports an empirical estimate of
equation (7), restricting the sample to single-family, owner-occupied homes and controlling
only for price and occupancy in 1930. The second column adds neighborhood-level controls
and the third incorporates both neighborhood fixed effects as well as block-level controls for
share renters and number of households in 1930. While results are generally consistent across
specifications, the model presented in column (3) is the most robust in terms of controls.
We therefore view it as our preferred specification.
The coefficient on the rent indicator measures the log of the capitalization rate for blocks
that did not experience racial transition, which we find to be 11 percent.11 Thus, in white
neighborhoods the annual rent that a real estate investor should have expected to receive
was about 11 percent of the value of the property. The coefficient on the racial transition
variable implies that houses on blocks that saw an influx of blacks lost 11 percent of their
value relative to blocks that remained white. Meanwhile, rents on these blocks increased by
37 percent relative to non-transitioning blocks (the exponent of the sum of the transition
main effect and the interaction between rented and transition).
11Consistent with our discussion above, this estimate is consistent with the expectation that our study periods high
levels of deflation would lead to capitalization rates that are in general larger than current-day capitalization rates
that tend to center in the neighborhood of 6 or 6.5 percent (see for instance: Davis et al. (2008)).
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Finally, the exponent of the sum of the racial transition coefficient and the interac-
tion of transition and rented gives us the capitalization rate in transitioning neighborhoods,
which is approximately 17 percent. Although we prefer to restrict our attention to single-
family, owner-occupied homes for the purpose of identification of the transition effect, we
also present results for a larger sample of addresses in column 4. Specifically, we also include
buildings that were rented in 1930.12 Our estimates are quantitatively similar, suggesting
that 1930 prices and occupancy together with ED fixed effects together control for housing
characteristics reasonably well.
All specifications indicate that racial transition was accompanied by falling home values,
sharply increasing rents, and a substantially higher capitalization rate. The finding that
rents and valuations diverged on transitioned blocks, while perhaps surprising at first, can
be rationalized by investors having exceedingly pessimistic expectations regarding housing
price depreciation or maintenance costs. One channel through which maintenance or depre-
ciation costs could have been higher for buildings on blocks undergoing racial transition is
through the impact of subdividing single-family housing into multiple rental units. Manag-
ing contracts with multiple households could have imposed direct costs, while the associated
increased occupancy itself could have led to more rapid physical depreciation.
We explore this notion further in panel B of Table 10, which repeats the estimations
from panel A with the log of aggregate occupancy as the outcome variable. The results in
all four columns are again quantitatively similar. First, we note that houses that switched
from being owned to rented saw increases in their aggregate occupancy of approximately
20 percent even on blocks that remained white. This increase was particularly pronounced
in blocks that transitioned. The estimates from column (3) indicate that rental occupancy
soared by 45 percent in homes that switched to being rented on such blocks.13 Interest-
ingly, the main effect of racial transition (i.e. in owner-occupied housing) is very small or
negative in all specifications, suggesting that higher-income families who did not need to
add members to their household to afford payments were the primary purchasers of homes
during the transition process. This finding is consistent with the narrative evidence that
12This specification requires additional controls for tenure status in 1930. We do not include mixed-tenure or
multiple owner addresses in this analysis because it is unclear how to aggregate a mix of valuations or valuations and
rents into an address-level price.
13That is, exp(.186-.021+.204) = 1.45.
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higher socioeconomic status black families were the first to arrive on a transitioning block
and bought their homes rather than renting them (e.g. Massey and Denton (1993)).
These occupancy results suggest that the observed increase in capitalization rates on
transitioned blocks, and the associated rent spikes, could simply be the direct result of
increases maintenance or physical depreciation costs arising from higher density habitation.
To examine this issue directly, in Table 11 we consider how capitalization rates varied with
both occupancy and 1940 racial composition, replicating our preferred baseline log-price
specification and splitting the sample between houses that experienced increased occupancy
rates and those that experienced decreased or unchanged occupancy rates. The results
suggest that while occupancy rates had a small impact on capitalization rates on blocks
that remained white, the magnitudes are too small to explain the bulk of the rent hikes
experienced in transitioning blocks. Even if we focus on an extreme subsample comprised
only of addresses that gained at least four members between 1930 and 1940, the capitalization
rate on blocks that remained white never exceeds 11.8 percent (see Table 16 which we
discuss below). We can thus reject the notion that our results are driven entirely by density.
Instead, the interaction of racial transition and higher density appears to have been uniquely
associated with the divergence in the price of owned and rented housing. Thus, black families
shouldered the burden of the segregated housing market on their own.
3.5.2 Heterogeneity Across Cities
The overall effects reported above mask significant heterogeneity across city types. To explore
this heterogeneity, we split the sample as follows. First, we aggregate the neighborhoods in
Baltimore, Cincinnati, and St. Louis into the category of “border” cities. These three
cities differ from the rest of our sample in that they already had relatively large black
populations as early as 1900. We split the remaining neighborhood sample in two based on
the rate at which southern black families migrated into cities during the first wave of the
Great Migration. Thus, Boston, Brooklyn, and Pittsburgh are categorized as low-migration
cities while Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Manhattan, and Philadelphia are identified as high-
migration cities.
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Table 12 reports results for our preferred specification (with ED fixed effects) for these
subgroups. The decomposition demonstrates that the drop in home values in transitioned
neighborhoods was the largest in the high-migration cities, with houses on blocks that became
majority black losing a staggering 54 percent of their value relative to houses on blocks that
remained white. On the other hand, we find that while rental premia were also higher in
high- migration cities than in low-migration in cities, black families renting on transitioning
blocks in border cities paid the largest rent premia. In these cities, rented housing was 86
percent more expensive on blocks undergoing transition. These two sets of results (price and
rental premia) together led the capitalization rates for housing on majority black blocks to
exceed 20 percent in both border and high-migration cities. The heterogeneity in occupancy
impacts are less striking, with addresses that both switched to being rentals and were located
on transitioning blocks seeing the smallest occupancy increases in low-migration cities.
3.5.3 Decomposing Transition
Our initial results are based on a relatively simple characterization of the racial transition
of city blocks: having moving from less than five percent black in 1930 to majority black in
1940. To develop a richer understanding of the underlying process, we explore the impact
of racial transition on prices and occupancy over the full range of 1940 black share. This
approach echoes our semiparametric analysis and provides insight into price dynamics on
blocks that were at different stages of racial transition. Specifically, we partition our sample
of blocks that were white in 1930 into four groups: those that remained white, those that
had between 1 and 10 percent black population in 1940, those that had between 10 and 50
percent black population in 1940, and those that had over 50 percent black population in
1940. The results from this analysis are presented in columns (1) and (4) of Table 13. For
ease of interpretation, we also present the results visually in Figures 9 and 10.
Figure 9 presents the overall effect of racial transition on prices, rents and capitalization
rates. Prices (rents) are expressed relative to the 1940 level of prices (rents) on blocks that
remained all white in 1940. Recall that our preferred specification includes neighborhood
(ED) fixed effects along with block-level controls. Thus, identification comes from variation
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in block-level racial composition from within a very small neighborhood and beyond that
which can be predicted by residential density and rental share. Turning first to prices,
relative to houses on blocks that did not transition, houses lost little of their value in the 10
to 50 percent black range. A stark difference occurs above 50 percent black where houses
lose 10 percent of their value. The same regression indicates that, relative to blocks that
remained all white, rents rose by 11 percent on blocks that were 10 to 50 percent black in
1940 an effect that grows to 39 percent on blocks that transitioned to over 50 percent black.
Similarly, relative to blocks that remained all white, the capitalization rate rises slowly until
blocks switch to being majority black, where it exceeds 16 percent.
In Figure 10 we summarize the results from column (3) of Table 11 for occupancy,
normalizing to the owner-occupancy rate in owner-occupied housing on blocks that did not
transition. Consistent with our baseline analysis, we find that houses that switched from
being owner occupied to rented and experienced no racial transition had on average 20
percent more occupants than did owner occupied houses on similar blocks. Houses that
remained owner occupied actually saw slight declines in the number of residents as they
transitioned. Conversely, rental units saw occupancy grow quickly as blocks experienced
racial transition. Relative to owner occupied housing on blocks that did not transition,
aggregate occupancy was 35 percent greater in rentals on blocks that were 10 to 50 percent
black and 45 percent greater on majority black. These results reinforce our basic finding that
subdividing of houses into high-occupancy rental units was a key component of the overall
transition process.
3.5.4 Selection
One potential concern with our empirical approach is that neighborhoods that were already
destined to experience declining values (or higher rents) were differentially targeted for racial
expansion, even after controlling for price in 1930. Perhaps most concerning is the role
played by proximity to the existing ghetto. The historical record, and our data, clearly
document that proximity to the existing ghetto was a strong predictor of racial transition.
If these neighborhoods were also destined to see systematic departures from price trends,
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for instance because of reduced city services or other forms of disinvestment, our results
could be biased. The inclusion of enumeration district (ED) fixed effects in our preferred
specification is largely a response to this concern as they will control for all factors effecting
prices and that are constant over small neighborhoods. However, it is still possible that even
differences in ghetto proximity across a few city blocks could lead to selection problems.
To investigate this possibility, we geocoded our sample of city blocks.14 This geocoded
subsample allows us to directly test the efficacy of our ED fixed effects in controlling for
ghetto proximity. Appendix Figure B1 presents a visualization of our geocoded blocks for
Detroit, which is typical of all of our sample cities. A limitation of our geocoding is that we
were only able to geocode approximately 87 percent of our sample. One concern is that this
subsample will vary systematically from our main sample as addresses that were targeted for
urban renewal and demolition in the sixties and seventies may be overwhelming represented
in the set of addresses that could not be geocoded. Columns (2) and (5) of Table 13 replicate
the models of columns (1) and (4) on the geocoded subsample, and showing this concern to
be valid. While qualitatively similar to the full-sample estimates, in the geocoded sample
the rental premia on majority black blocks are smaller. Thus, it is important to focus within
the geocoded subsample when assessing the impact of controls for distance to the ghetto on
our coefficients of interest. Columns (3) and (6) add a control for distance to the nearest
ghetto (defined as miles to an enumeration district that was at least 15 percent black) to
the model. Comparing these results to those in columns (2) and (5) demonstrates that
while ghetto distance is negatively associated with price, all other coefficient estimates are
virtually identical, suggesting that the inclusion of enumeration district fixed effects provides
sufficient controls for this source of selection bias.
Distance to the ghetto is not the only potential source of concern. The historical record
suggests other factors also predicted selection into blockbusting. Table 14 presents average
1930 characteristics for our sample of blocks that were less than 5 percent black and had at
least one owner-occupied single-family home by various stages of racial transition in 1940.
While distance to nearest ghetto is by far the best predictor of racial transition, other sources
of selection are also evident. For instance, the average age of household heads in 1930 is
14See the Data Appendix B for a description of this process.
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two years higher in blocks that transitioned (47.5 versus 45.5), which is consistent with the
narrative on blockbusting. In contrast to the literature, we do not find that per person rents
were ex ante lower in blocks that would end up transitioning in 1930. This finding could be
due to our sample restrictions, however, which exclude blocks comprised entirely of rentals
or apartments. Appendix Figure B2 visualizes selection into racial transition again in the
city of Detroit. While the majority of blocks that transition are near existing majority-black
blocks, it is not true for all of them.
As a final test of our fixed effects strategy, we investigate whether any of these factors
is also predictive in our baseline empirical approach. Table 15 presents the results of a
block-level estimation of the determinants of racial transition for blocks that had at least
one owner-occupied single-family home and were less than five percent black in 1930. We
include ED fixed effects in addition to controls for household head age, share laborer, foreign-
born share, average rent per person, homeownership share, and distance to nearest ghetto
(the latter for geocoded blocks only). None of the reported predictors is economically and
statistically significant in either the full or geocoded samples, whether we measure black
share continuously (columns 1-3) or with an indicator for majority black (columns 4-6). We
take the results of Table 15 as strong evidence that our price and occupancy results are
driven by racial transition and not by other factors.
3.6 DISCUSSION
We have thus far shown that black arrivals on a block caused rents and home values to diverge,
with increases in occupancy in addresses that became rentals. An important question for
understanding the implications of these results is how much of the drop in home values
was borne by black versus white households. For instance, if pioneer black families mainly
rented their homes and waited to buy until prices had fallen, the decline in values associated
with racial transition could have had a “silver lining” for black homeownership (Boustan
and Margo (2013)). However, black families would still have faced high rents and declining
public and private services in their neighborhoods.
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We explore the question of homeownership by race in Figure 11 where we reproduce
our race-specific semiparametric regressions with homeownership as the dependent variable.
Panel A shows that black households were far more likely to buy houses if they arrived early
in the transition process: about three-quarters of black residents were homeowners on blocks
that were ten percent black but only a third were homeowners on blocks that were majority
black. Meanwhile, about 70 percent of white families residing on the average block owned
their homes throughout the entire transition process (Panel B). Because large declines in
home values did not occur until blocks were majority black (see Figure 8), these results
suggest that proportionally more homes switched hands from white to black families prior to
the drop in values that accompanied racial transition. Rents did not sharply increase until a
block was more than 50 percent black, when Figure 11 shows that most black families were
renters. As a result, black families appear to have borne the worst of both the spike in rents
and the fall in home values.
The question of who owned the rental housing in black neighborhoods is important for
understanding our findings given that only 30 percent of families were homeowners once the
racial transition process was complete. Census data do not allow us to observe the landlord
of rented buildings. However, we can speculate on the incentives facing real estate investors
by considering the degree to which the relatively low income of black families, which required
them to live more densely in both owned and rented housing, can explain investor pessimism.
Specifically, we explore in more detail the role of density in determining capitalization rates,
focusing solely on blocks that remained white in 1940.
In Table 16, we replicate our basic specifications from Table 10 on subsamples of addresses
that saw increases in occupancy but remained white through 1940. Here, we only report
the coefficient on the “rented” indicator variable. Even if we limit the analysis to addresses
that gained at least four members between 1930 and 1940, the capitalization rate implied by
these coefficients never exceeds 11.8 percent. Clearly, even large density increases in homes
on whites blocks did not translate into the same high capitalization rates observed in homes
on transitioning blocks. We thus reject the notion that our results are all driven by density.
Investor pessimism was highly racialized, and drops in prices only occurred when increases
in density were accompanied by the transition from white to black occupants.
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3.7 CONCLUSION
Our evidence suggests a blockbusting process that is consistent with the stylized facts from
the narrative history. First, racial turnover was associated with rapid and dramatic falls
in home values. Real estate investors, faced with the costs of creating and maintaining
rental units that were going to depreciate in value and a ready supply of black households
desperate for housing outside of the already underserved ghetto, were able to charge high
enough rental prices to make their investment worthwhile. These processes overlapped and
fueled the blockbusting process, which saw entire sections of cities transition from being all
white to majority black over a relatively short period, with devastating results for black
household wealth.
58
3.8 FIGURES AND TABLES






















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Percent Black 1930
Binned Means Change Pct. Black
95% CI
Block-Level Racial Transition
Notes: The figure presents a local polynomial smooth of block-level percent black in 1930 against the percent
change in black share on the block over the next decade for every block in our sample.
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Figure 7: Semiparametric Relationship Between Percent Black and Rents
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95% CI
Robinson Double Residual w/ Full Controls
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Pct. Black on the Block in 1940
fblack(% black on block in 1940) 90% CI
fwhite(% black on block in 1940)
Robinson Double Residual w/ Full Controls
Ln. (Rent 1940) vs.  Pct Black on Block in 1940
Notes: These figures show the semiparametric relationship between percent black on the block in 1940 (independent 
variable) and log rent in 1940 (dependent variable) on our baseline sample of homes that were single family, owner 
occupied, and located on a block that was at most 5 percent black in 1930. Controls are included for 1930 price and 
occupancy at the address level, share renters and total number of addresses at the block level, and share black, 
share immigrant, share laborer, mean age, median home value, median rent, and median occupational score at the 
neighborhood level. The estimation method is Robinsons double residual method (1988). We also include binned 
residuals from the regression on each chart.
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Figure 8: Semiparametric Relationship Between Percent Black and Home Values
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Binned Residuals f(% black on block in 1940)
95% CI
Robinson Double Residual w/ Full Controls
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Pct. Black on the Block in 1940
fblack(% black on block in 1940) 90% CI
fwhite(% black on block in 1940)
Semi-Parametric Results w/ Full Controls
Ln. (Price 1940) vs.  Pct Black on Block in 1940
Notes: These figures show the semiparametric relationship between percent black on the block in 1940 (independent 
variable) and log home price in 1940 (dependent variable) on our baseline sample of homes that were single family, 
owner occupied, and located on a block that was at most 5 percent black in 1930. Controls are included for 1930 
price and occupancy at the address level, share renters and total number of addresses at the block level, and share 
black, share immigrant, share laborer, mean age, median home value, median rent, and median occupational score 
at the neighborhood level. The estimation method is Robinsons double residual method (1988). We also include 
binned residuals from the regression on each chart.
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Figure 9: Effect of Racial Transition on Prices
Notes: The figure shows the effects from the estimation of equation (7) presented in column (1) of Table 12 on our
baseline sample of homes that were single family, owner occupied, and located on a block that was at most 5
percent black in 1930. The regression includes controls for the 1930 occupancy and price at the address level,
block-level controls for number of households and share renters, and ED fixed effects. Both the overall price and
rent effects are scaled relative to a house that remains owned on an all-white block.
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Figure 10: Effect of Racial Transition on Occupancy
Notes: The figure shows the effects from the estimation of equation (7) presented in column (4) of Table 12 on our
baseline sample single-family, owner-occupied homes located on blocks that were less than five percent black in
1930. The regression includes controls for the 1930 occupancy and price at the address level, block-level controls for
number of households and share renters, and ED fixed effects.
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Figure 11: Ownership Rate vs. Pct. Black on the Block in 1940
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Percent Black on Block in 1940
Binned Means Mean Ownership Rate
95% CI
Ownership Rate vs. Pct. Black on the Block in 1940
Notes: These figures show the semiparametric relationship between percent black on the block in 1940 (independent 
variable) and log rent in 1940 (dependent variable) on our baseline sample of homes that were single family, owner 
occupied, and located on a block that was at most 5 percent black in 1930. Controls are included for 1930 price and 
occupancy at the address level, share renters and total number of addresses at the block level, and share black, 
share immigrant, share laborer, mean age, median home value, median rent, and median occupational score at the 
neighborhood level. The estimation method is Robinsons double residual method (1988). We also include binned 
residuals from the regression on each chart.
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Table 9: Summary Statistics for Addresses in Baseline Matched Dataset
Block did not transition Block did transition
1930 1940 1930 1940
Nominal home value 6296.01 3901.78 5999.48 3591.37
(3496.97) (2336.39) (3785.25) (2355.28)
Aggregate monthly rent - 35.44 - 38.95
- (24.79) - (31.47)
Aggregate occupancy 4.32 4.17 4.57 4.95
(1.85) (2.05) (2.08) (3.01)
Aggregate households 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.25
(0.05) (0.39) (0.05) (0.81)
Number of owner-occupied houses 256,471 194,633 2,726 1,560
Number of rental houses - 61,838 - 1,166
Note: This table reports statistics on our baseline sample of homes that were single family, owner occupied,
and located on a block that was at most 5 percent black in 1930 and could be matched across the 1930
and 1940 censuses. Transition is defined as having at least 10 percent black population in 1940.
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Table 10: Main Results: Price and Occupancy
Panel A: Log price No Controls Controls ED FE All Obs FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rented -2.239*** -2.232*** -2.211*** -2.154***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Racial Transition -0.204*** -0.130*** -0.113*** -0.147***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.038) (0.032)
Rented x Transition 0.394*** 0.416*** 0.430*** 0.327***
(0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.033)
Observations 248,560 247,896 248,560 414,223
R-squared 0.737 0.753 0.801 0.817
Panel B: Log occupancy No Controls Controls ED FE All Obs FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rented 0.170*** 0.185*** 0.186*** 0.189***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Racial Transition 0.010 -0.018 -0.021 -0.047*
(0.026) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026)
Rented x Transition 0.248*** 0.244*** 0.204*** 0.156***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.027)
Observations 259,197 252,424 253,375 422,409
R-squared 0.025 0.212 0.252 0.380
Note: The table reports the OLS estimation of equation (7) on our baseline sample of homes that were
single family, owner occupied, and located on a block that was at most 5 percent black in 1930. The first
column controls only for price and occupancy of the address in 1930. The second column adds controls
share renters and total number of addresses at the block level, and share black, share immigrant, share
laborer, mean age, median home value, median rent, and median occupational score at the neighborhood
level. The third column drops the neighborhood controls and includes ED fixed effects. The last column
adds addresses that were rented in 1930 to the sample and uses the specification from column (3) with an
additional control for tenure status in 1930. The “rented” variable is an indicator for whether the house
switched to being a rental in 1940. The transition indicator is equal to one if the block became more than
50 percent black by 1940.
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Table 11: Capitalization Rates by Occupancy Change
All Addresses
Percent black on block in 1940 Sales Rent Cap. Rate
0 100.00% 100.00% 10.93%
0-10% 97.73% 106.72% 11.93%
10-50% 99.10% 111.29% 12.27%
50-100% 90.03% 138.96% 16.86%
Observations 248,560
Occupancy Increased
Percent black on block in 1940 Sales Rent Cap. Rate
0 100.00% 100.00% 11.28%
0-10% 96.27% 110.52% 12.95%
10-50% 95.89% 112.30% 13.21%
50-100% 72.33% 116.18% 18.12%
Observations 73,905
Occupancy Decreased/Constant
Percent black on block in 1940 Sales Rent Cap. Rate
0 100.00% 100.00% 10.33%
0-10% 99.60% 100.00% 10.37%
10-50% 102.02% 100.50% 10.18%
50-100% 100.30% 134.99% 13.90%
Observations 174,655
Note: The table reports the implied capitalization rates from an OLS estimation of equation
(7) on our baseline sample of homes that were single family, owner occupied, and located on
a block that was at most 5 percent black in 1930. Regressions include controls for price and
occupancy of the address in 1930, share renters and total number of addresses at the block
level, and ED fixed effects. See text for details on how to compute the capitalization rate from
regression coefficients.
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Table 12: Heterogeneity by City Type
Panel A: Log price All Cities Border High Mig. Low Mig.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rented -2.211*** -2.098*** -2.252*** -2.254***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003)
Racial Transition -0.113*** 0.096 -0.766*** -0.202***
(0.038) (0.066) (0.184) (0.046)
Rented x Transition 0.430*** 0.525*** 0.707*** 0.256***
(0.043) (0.073) (0.178) (0.055)
Observation 248,560 73,286 29,797 145,477
R-squared 0.801 0.757 0.785 0.826
Panel B: Log occupancy All Cities Border High Mig. Low Mig.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rented 0.186*** 0.212*** 0.264*** 0.160***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Racial Transition -0.021 0.073 -0.057 -0.085**
(0.029) (0.047) (0.141) (0.039)
Rented x Transition 0.204*** 0.226*** 0.242* 0.162***
(0.033) (0.052) (0.137) (0.045)
Observation 253,375 76,887 30,543 145,945
R-squared 0.252 0.246 0.309 0.239
Note: The table reports the OLS estimation of equation (7) on our baseline sample of homes
that were single family, owner occupied, and located on a block that was at most 5 percent
black in 1930. Regressions include controls for price and occupancy of the address in 1930,
share renters and total number of addresses at the block level, and ED fixed effects. The
transition indicator is equal to one if the block became more than 50 percent black by 1940.
Border cities are Baltimore, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. High-migration cities are Chicago,
Cleveland, Detroit, Manhattan, and Philadelphia. Low-migration cities are Boston, Brooklyn,
and Pittsburgh. See text for more detail on this classification.
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Table 13: Results for Racial Transition and Proximity to Ghetto
Dependent variable = log price Dependent variable = log occupancy
All blocks Geocoded Geocoded All blocks Geocoded Geocoded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rented -2.214*** -2.222*** -2.222*** 0.186*** 0.185*** 0.185***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Transition 1-10% -0.023** -0.018 -0.018 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Rented x 1-10% 0.088*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.074*** 0.074***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Transition 10-50% -0.009 -0.057** -0.055** -0.037** -0.044** -0.044**
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018)
Rented x 10-50% 0.116*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.153***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
Transition 50-100% -0.105*** -0.233*** -0.231*** -0.026 -0.053 -0.053
(0.038) (0.049) (0.049) (0.029) (0.038) (0.038)
Rented x 50-100% 0.434*** 0.353*** 0.353*** 0.214*** 0.136*** 0.136***
(0.043) (0.056) (0.056) (0.033) (0.044) (0.044)
Distance to Near. Ghetto 0.102*** -0.008
(0.012) (0.010)
Observations 248,560 217,124 217,124 253,375 221,472 221,472
R-squared 0.801 0.804 0.804 0.248 0.251 0.251
Note: The table reports the OLS estimation of equation (7) on our baseline sample of homes that were single
family, owner occupied, and located on a block that was at most 5 percent black in 1930. Regressions include
controls for price and occupancy of the address in 1930, share renters and total number of addresses at the
block level, and ED fixed effects.
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Table 14: Selection into Racial Transition in Baseline Sample
Share Black on Block in 1940
Mean on block in 1930: <10% 10-50% >50%
Average age of heads of HH 45.53 47.36 47.66
Share laborer heads of HH 0.07 0.09 0.06
Share foreign born heads of HH 0.38 0.45 0.39
Average rent per person 4.32 5.01 5.46
Ownership share 0.09 0.06 0.09
Distance to nearest ghetoo 1.45 0.29 0.07
Share black in 1930 0.00 0.01 0.01
N 41378 415 190
Note: This table reports statistics on our baseline sample of homes that were
single family, owner occupied, and located on a block that was at most 5 percent
black in 1930 and could be matched across the 1930 and 1940 censuses.
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Table 15: Predicting Racial Transition in Baseline Sample
Percent Black in 1940 Percent Black in 1940 >50%
Block characteristics in 1930: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average age of heads of HH -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share laborer heads of HH 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share foreign born heads of HH 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average rent per person -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ownership share -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to nearest ghetto -0.005* -0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Sample All Geo. Geo. All Geo. Geo.
Observations 41,968 35,248 35,248 41,968 35,248 35,248
R-squared 0.635 0.665 0.665 0.602 0.623 0.623
Note: This table reports OLS estimations of selection into racial transition using our baseline sample of blocks
that had at least one owner-occupied, single-family home and were at most 5 percent black in 1930.
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Table 16: Rental Indicators for Addresses on Blocks that Remain White
No Controls Controls ED FE All Obs FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All addresses -2.240*** -2.234*** -2.213*** -2.156***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Addresses that gained at least 2 members -2.172*** -2.160*** -2.168*** -2.102***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Addresses that gained at least 3 members -2.150*** -2.143*** -2.170*** -2.093***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011)
Addresses that gained at least 4 members -2.116*** -2.105*** -2.141*** -2.067***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.024) (0.017)
Note: The table reports the OLS estimation of equation (7) on our baseline sample of homes that were single
family, owner occupied, and located on a block that was at most 5 percent black in both 1930 and 1940. The
first column controls only for price and occupancy of the address in 1930. The second column adds controls
share renters and total number of addresses at the block level, and share black, share immigrant, share laborer,
mean age, median home value, median rent, and median occupational score at the neighborhood level. The
third column drops the neighborhood controls and includes ED fixed effects. The last column adds addresses
that were rented in 1930 to the sample and uses the specification from column (3) with an additional control
for tenure status in 1930. The table reports the coefficient on the “rented” variable, which is an indicator
for whether the house switched to being a rental in 1940. The exponent of this coefficient yields the relevant
capitalization rate.
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4.0 INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY IN PREWAR AMERICA:
A COMPARISON BY RACE AND REGION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Either geographical or racial differences in the rates of intergenerational mobility in the
United States has been well documented in the existing literature (Collins and Wanamaker
(2017); Chetty et al. (2014); Mazumder (2014); Hertz (2009)). However, studies that com-
pare the rates of intergenerational mobility by both race and region are rare. The only one
that I am aware of is Davis and Mazumder (2018), in which they use the 1979 National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth data to investigate the relationship between geographic dif-
ferences in intergenerational mobility and the geographical distributions of different racial
groups. They find that gaps in intergenerational mobility by race are significantly larger
than those by region.
But the 1970s marks the end of the Great Migration (1910-1970), during which millions
of blacks flee their homeland in search of better opportunities for themselves and their
children. Black populations have been significantly re-distributed from rural South to the
urban North by 1970. Recent research by Derenoncourt (2019) shows that racial composition
changes during the peak of the Great Migration (1940-1970) increased the upward mobility
gap between blacks and whites in the North.
Therefore, in this paper, I ask whether the relationship between race and region in
intergenerational mobility found at Davis and Mazumder (2018) holds at the beginning of the
Great Migration. To do so, I compare the rates of intergenerational occupational mobility
across four groups between 1910 and 1930: (1) northern blacks, (2) northern whites, (3)
southern blacks, and (4) southern whites.
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Due to northern blacks’ small size in population, early studies that used census sample
datasets from IPUMS have mainly focused either on southern blacks and their mobility
relationship with southern whites (Collins and Wanamaker (2017)) or on ALL blacks in the
North (Derenoncourt (2019); Boustan (2009)). With the release of digitized complete-count
decennial census manuscripts, I was able to distinguish northern blacks, who have been
settled in the North for generations before the Great Migration, from black migrants from
the South in 1910. To my knowledge, this paper is the first one studying intergenerational
mobility of these northern blacks and the racial mobility gap in the North in the prewar
(World War II) era. To facilitate comparison, I applied a consistent linking method in
sample construction where I link fathers in 1910 to their sons in 1930 for those four groups
mentioned above. In these datasets, I observe self-reported occupations for both fathers and
sons, allowing me to analyze the degree to which a father’s occupation helped his son in
accessing a given profession.
Following previous literature, I use Altham statistics to measure such “advantage” (Pe´rez
(2019); Long and Ferrie (2013)). In a society with only two occupations available, mobility
can be captured by the cross-product ratio of the occupational transition matrix. When more
than two occupations present, Altham statistics aggregate the differences in cross-product
ratios into one single statistics, thus providing us a simple measure to assess whether and
by how much the father-son association in one group differs from that in another group.
I find that northern blacks had the highest mobility level among all groups, followed by
northern whites, southern blacks, and southern whites. It makes sense to see that southerners
have lower mobility levels than northerners. Both whites and blacks had limited economic
opportunity in the South, including retarded industrial development and an agricultural
system based heavily on the labor of landless farm tenants and sharecroppers (Alexander
et al. (2017)). While the North was praised as the “promised land” for blacks, I find that
racial mobility gap in the North is larger than it is in the South. Unlike the finding in Davis
and Mazumder (2018) for the 1970s, both racial mobility gaps by region are smaller than
regional mobility gap for blacks.
When splitting the sample of southern blacks into migrants (moved between 1910 and
1930) and stayers, I show that the mobility level of southern black migrants is closer to the
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one for northern blacks, much higher than the one for southern black stayers. However,
when combining these southern black migrants with northern blacks, I see an overall lower
joint mobility level for blacks and an even more significant racial gap in the North, echoing
the conclusion of Derenoncourt (2019) that postwar migration destinations have become the
mobility traps for blacks in the North. These results suggest that migration helped south-
ern blacks through improving their absolute economic mobility, rather than their relative
mobility with whites.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3 describes the
methodology. Section 4 presents the result. Section 5 discusses and concludes.
4.2 DATA
4.2.1 Linking
The study of intergenerational mobility requires dataset that contains labor market outcomes
for both parents and children. I use the complete-count U.S. census from 1910 and 1930 to
construct father-son linked datasets for northern blacks, northern whites, southern blacks,
and southern whites.
In each of these datasets, I limit the initial sample to native-born males, aged 0 to 17,
residing in their region of birth with their native-born father or step-father in 1910. The age
restriction ensures that these boys in 1910 were young enough to be living with their parents
and would be old enough to be participating in the labor force in 1930.1 I can then compare
their fathers’ labor market outcomes in 1910 to their adult labor market outcomes in 1930. In
this linking exercise, I cannot link women because they tend to change their maiden names
upon marriage. Historical records linking, due to the lack of unique numerical identifier,
has to rely on names and other time-invariant variables, such as place of birth and year of
birth, to trace people across datasets. For the northern black and northern white samples,
1Region of birth is either in the South or in the North. Following previous literature, I define the following 14
states as the South: Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia (Collins and Wanamaker (2015); Collins and
Wanamaker (2014); Boustan (2009)).
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I also require individuals to be urban residents, since the majority of the northern blacks at
that time resided in the urban area, such restriction will ensure a fair comparison between
northern blacks and northern whites.
As briefly mentioned above, I relied on race, the exact first and last names, self and
parents’ birthplaces, birth year to find individuals across censuses. Unfortunately, these
variables do not always uniquely identify a person. Moreover, they are prone to errors from
enumeration and transcription. A consistent linking methodology can help alleviate some
of the selection concerns from linking. In this paper, I applied a procedure that is first
developed by Ferrie (1996) and later advanced by Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (e.g.,
Abramitzky et al. (2012)). The basic steps are described below.
First, I clean the names by removing any non-alphabetic characters and by correcting
common misspellings and nicknames. For example, Mike, Michael, and Micheal would be
recognized as the same name. Second, I restrict the datasets in both 1910 and 1930 to
individuals who are unique by their set of linking variables. In other words, exact matches
can only be one-to-one matches. Third, for those individuals who do not have exact matches
found, I search for matches within ±3 years and only allow single matches. Overall, I started
with more than 12 million unique records in 1910 and was able to identify around 14.5% of
these records in 1930. The match rate breaks down by race and region is shown in Table
17.
4.2.2 Occupational Transition Matrices
Using these linked samples, I build intergenerational occupational transition matrices for
northern whites, northern blacks, southern whites, southern blacks in Table 18.2 Columns in
these matrices represent the adulthood occupations of the boys in 1930, and rows represent
the occupations of their fathers in 1910. Each cell in the matrix represents the counts
of sons with occupation Xs conditional on having a father with occupation Xf (share in
the parenthesis, sum to 100 within rows). An individual with a non-civilian occupational
response for himself or his father is excluded.
2In terms of labor market outcomes, wage data was not collected by census until 1940, but the self-reported
occupation was available for both 1910 and 1930.
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Following previous literature, each father and son with occupational information was clas-
sified into one of the four categories: White Collar, Farmer, Skilled/Semiskilled, and Unskilled
(Long and Ferrie (2013); Pe´rez (2019)).3 Specifically, White Collar comprises professional,
technical, and kindred; managers, officials, and proprietors; clerical and sales. Farmer com-
prises only farm owners and farm managers. Skilled/Semiskilled comprises craftsmen and
operatives. Unskilled comprises service workers and laborers.
As expected, very few northerners (both blacks and whites) were farmers in either 1910 or
1930.4 For all groups, there is a noticeable transition out of farming between 1910 and 1930.
For example, more than 64% of the southern blacks and southern whites were employed in
agriculture in 1910. However, the proportion of sons entering farming in 1930 is significantly
lower in 1930: only 20% of the southerners remained as farmers.
From the fathers’ generation to sons’ generation, northern blacks had increased shares
in white-collar and skilled blue-collar occupations, at the same time, decreased shares in
farmers and unskilled occupations. It is consistent with my finding in a previous paper where
I show that the Great Migration of southern blacks promoted northern blacks’ occupational
upgrading (Li (2019)).
4.3 METHODOLOGY
Sociological literature has long been using the transition matrices like Table 18 to study
occupational mobility, with the diagonal cells represent immobility and thus mobility is
measured by the proportion of people who fall in off-diagonal cells. However, such mobility
rate is affected by the marginal distributions of a mobility table. For example, assuming the
occupation of the son is independent of the occupation of the father in the following two
groups:
3Using such broader occupational category also lessen the concern that the degree of intergenerational mobility
would be affected by the earlier career stage of some of the sons.





Father Occ1 Occ2 MarginalDist.(Father)
Occ1 2500 2500 50%






Father Occ1 Occ2 MarginalDist.(Father)
Occ1 625 1875 25%
Occ2 1875 5625 75%
MarginalDist.(Son) 25% 75%

Because they have different marginal distributions, the fraction of sons working on a
different occupation than their father is 1/2 in Group 1 and 3/8 in Group 2. To avoid the
confounding of marginal distributions, I followed the previous literature and used Altham
statistics to measure mobility (Pe´rez (2019); Long and Ferrie (2013)).
First, Altham statistics remove the impact of marginal distributions by adjusting the
marginal frequencies in both rows and columns to be consistent across two matrices. The
fraction of sons working on a different occupation than their father in Group 2 above will
have been 1/2 as well if we adjust the marginal frequencies in Group 2 to be the same as
Group 1. Such adjustment is possible because we can multiply the rows and columns of
a matrix by arbitrary constants without altering the underlying association between rows







the cross-product ratio is
(HsHf∗LsLf )
(HsLf∗LsHf ) . If we multiply each element in the first row by an
arbitrary constant r1, in the second row by an arbitrary constant r2, in the first column by





So the cross-product ratio
HsHf r1s1∗LsLf r2s2








, which is the ratio of (1) the odds that sons of job H father
get job H rather than job L to (2) the odds that sons of job L fathers get job H rather
than job L. With perfect mobility, sons of job H fathers would have no advantage in getting
job H relative to sons of job L fathers. The cross-product ratio would be 1. The more the
cross-product ratio exceeds 1, the greater the relative advantage of having a job H father in
getting job H.
With more than two occupational categories, there will be more than one cross-product
ratio. Altham statistics aggregate the differences in cross-product ratios into one single
statistics, allowing us to compare the full mobility patterns. Given two matrices P and Q of
size r x s, the Altham statistic d(P, Q) measures whether and by how much the father-son
















Here, father’s occupation is indexed by i and l, and son’s occupation is indexed by j
and m. pij denotes the probability of a son obtaining an occupation j given his father’s
occupation is i. The two-way odds ratio is θijlm = log(
pij/pim
plj/plm
). Higher values of d(P, Q)
imply larger differences in the row-column association. Therefore, if we compare each of the
matrices in Table 18 to an independence matrix J (i.e., a matrix in which all the odds ratios
are one), we can tell which group exhibits more mobility (i.e., closer to independence). In
other words, if we observe that d(P, Q) 6= 0 and that d(P, J) < d(Q, J), we can conclude
that P has higher mobility than Q.5
5Note that Altham statistics do not require us to assume any occupational hierarchy. Movements across categories
are treated symmetrically regardless of the origin and destination categories. Therefore, mobility could include a mix




Table 19 presents the results of calculating Altham statistic comparing each group down the
rows to corresponding groups across the columns. For each pair, we can reject the hypotheses
that their mobility patterns are the same. Each cell in the first column shows the distance
between group i in the rows and the independence matrix J. Since the greater departure
from independence implies less mobility, the statistics suggest that northern blacks had the
highest mobility, followed by northern whites, southern whites, and southern blacks.
Comparing the mobility of the same race across regions, we see that northerners and
southerners have different mobility patterns. The distance between northern blacks and
southern blacks is 6.71, and it is 5.14 between northern whites and southern whites, both
significantly different from zero.
Comparing the mobility of the same region across racial groups, we see that racial mo-
bility difference in the North, which is 4.12, is greater than it is in the South, which is 1.98.
Moreover, these racial mobility differences in either region are smaller than regional mobility
differences for blacks, which is 6.71. In other words, the mobility pattern of northern blacks
looks more similar to that of northern whites than to southern blacks.
With the Great Migration got underway in this period, I split the sample of southern
blacks into migrants and stayers, where I define migrants by comparing their regions of
residence between 1910 and 1930. Table 19 shows that the departure from independence is
almost twice as large for southern black stayers relative to northern blacks. This pattern
is consistent with mobility levels being higher in the “promised land” for blacks. Overall,
migrants have a higher mobility level than stayers. Moreover, their mobility patterns are
closer to northern blacks [d(SB migrants, NB) = 4.07***], rather than to southern black
stayers [d(SB migrants, SB stayers) = 6.04***]. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 20,
the mobility matrix for southern black migrants is quite similar to the mobility matrix for
northern blacks, particularly the occupational distributions for sons. Compare to southern
black stayers, both southern black migrants and northern blacks had higher barriers to enter
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the labor market as farmers for sons of non-farmers and a higher likelihood of leaving farming
for sons of farmers. These patterns suggest that the similarity in mobility levels between
northern blacks and southern black migrants is not simply a result of using the Altham
statistics as the measure of mobility.
Not only did northern blacks have a mobility level that is more similar to northern whites
than to southern blacks, southern black stayers also have a mobility level that is more similar
to southern whites than to northern blacks, or even southern black migrants [d(SB stayers,
SW) = 2.36***] < [d(SB stayers, SB migrants) = 6.04***] < [d(SB stayers, NB) =
7.21***]. Overall, geography has a greater impact than race on mobility for blacks in this
period.
Lastly, I show that I can replicate the key findings in the postwar era by comparing ALL
blacks in the North with northern whites and southern black stayers. Here, blacks in the
North include both northern blacks and southern black migrants who moved North between
1910 and 1930. Table 21 presents the Altham statistics. We see that blacks in the North
had a much lower mobility level than northern blacks alone [d(All Blacks, J) = 12.30***
> d(N.Blacks, J) = 6.98***]. Moreover, the racial gap in the North is larger than it was
without adding migrants [d(All Blacks, N.Whites) = 7.87*** > d(N.Blacks, N.Whites)
= 4.12***]. These findings corroborate with the conclusion in Derenoncourt (2019), that is,
postwar migration destinations have become the mobility traps for blacks in the North. I also
find that racial mobility gap in the North exceeds regional gap in mobility after including
southern black migrants [d(All Blacks, N.Whites) = 7.87*** > d(All Blacks, S.Black
Stayers) = 5.89***], consistent with the result in Davis and Mazumder (2018). Again, these
results suggest that the mobility relationship between race and region in the prewar era is
not driven by using Altham statistics to measure mobility but is driven by migration causing
the demographic composition change in different regions.
4.4.2 Robustness Checks
The fact that there are no many farmers in the northerner samples could be a concern. To
assess whether my results are driven by the low share of farmers in the North, I exclude
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farmers from all groups for both generations. Table C1 in the Appendix replicates Table 19,
presenting the Altham statistic without farmers. We can see that, although the numbers are
getting smaller, the ranking of groups in terms of their distance from independence does not
change. All the observations listed in the main results above still hold.
The current classification for unskilled workers include both farm labors and other un-
skilled workers. I also re-estimate the Altham statistics separating farm labors from other
unskilled workers. As expected, Table C2 in the Appendix displays a higher mobility level
because five instead of four occupational categories are used. However, all the results are
qualitatively similar to Table 19.
In the linking procedures, I allow age to vary ± 3 for those having no exact matches
found. It could increase the chance of false matches, which have always been a concern in
the study of intergenerational mobility. In Table C3, I show the robustness of my main
results by restricting the sample to exact matches. Reassuring, we see a similar pattern as
the main results.
4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The U.S. North in the early twentieth century has been praised as the “promised land”
for blacks. Millions of southern blacks left their hometowns and headed North into Detroit,
Chicago, New York, and many other northern cities. Yet, there is no existing study providing
us the mobility picture for northern blacks and how they fare with northern whites at the
beginning of the Great Migration. Moreover, despite the immense amount of literature on
black-white disparities, few studies have paid direct attention to the differences within the
racial group shaped by region.
In this paper, I study intergenerational mobility for northern blacks, who settled in
the North for generations before the arrival of southern migrants, and their relationship
with northern whites, as well as southern blacks. I show that northern blacks had different
mobility pattern from both the pattern for the northern whites and the pattern for southern
blacks. Moreover, northern blacks and northern whites are closer in mobility level than do
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northern blacks and southern blacks. In fact, regional mobility gap for blacks is greater than
racial mobility gaps in both the South and the North.
I show that migration helped southern blacks successfully translate their geographic mo-
bility into economic mobility: southern black migrants have a mobility level that is closer
to northern blacks than to southern black stayers. When including black migrants to make
comparison with northern whites and southern black stayers, racial mobility gap was in-
creased and become more substantial than the regional mobility gap among blacks. This
finding is consistent with the prior literature using data from the 1970s, lending one support
to the argument that the Great Migration reshaped the North.
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Table 17: Match Rate by Race and Region
Initial Sample in 1910 Matched Sample in 1930 Match Rate %
Northern Whites 7,895,666 763,027 9.66
Northern Blacks 139,113 13,386 9.62








Table 18: Intergenerational Occupational Mobility, by Race and Region
Son’s Occupation
Father’s Occupation White Collar Farmer Skilled/semi-skilled Unskilled Row Total
Northern Whites
White Collar 110578 2780 46626 67523 227507
(48.60%) (1.22%) (20.49%) (29.68%) (100.00%)
Farmer 4971 1087 3840 5233 15131
(32.85%) (7.18%) (25.38%) (34.58%) (100.00%)
Skilled/semi-skilled 100360 3351 113702 105813 323226
(31.05%) (1.04%) (35.18%) (32.74%) (100.00%)
Unskilled 34638 1992 41318 47066 125014
(27.71%) (1.59%) (33.05%) (37.65%) (100.00%)
Column Total 250547 9210 205486 225635 690878
(36.27%) (1.33%) (29.74%) (32.66%) (100.00%)
Northern Blacks
White Collar 285 5 236 614 1140
(25.00%) (0.44%) (20.70%) (53.86%) (100.00%)
Farmer 29 0 58 122 209
(13.88%) (0.00%) (27.75%) (58.37%) (100.00%)
Skilled/semi-skilled 298 4 627 1406 2335
(12.76%) (0.17%) (26.85%) (60.21%) (100.00%)
Unskilled 990 32 1849 5648 8519
(11.62%) (0.38%) (21.70%) (66.30%) (100.00%)
Column Total 1602 41 2770 7790 12203
(13.13%) (0.34%) (22.70%) (63.84%) (100.00%)




Father’s Occupation White Collar Farmer Skilled/semi-skilled Unskilled Row Total
Southern Whites
White Collar 40571 6200 18830 27068 92669
(43.78%) (6.69%) (20.32%) (29.21%) (100.00%)
Farmer 65960 133671 102109 182539 484279
(13.62%) (27.60%) (21.08%) (37.69%) (100.00%)
Skilled/semi-skilled 21939 6200 36828 32782 97749
(22.44%) (6.34%) (37.68%) (33.54%) (100.00%)
Unskilled 12325 10262 22915 36001 81503
(15.12%) (12.59%) (28.12%) (44.17%) (100.00%)
Column Total 140795 156333 180682 278390 756200
(18.62%) (20.67%) (23.89%) (36.81%) (100.00%)
Southern Blacks
White Collar 421 373 659 2498 3951
(10.66%) (9.44%) (16.68%) (63.22%) (100.00%)
Farmer 2607 36373 16598 86583 142161
(1.83%) (25.59%) (11.68%) (60.90%) (100.00%)
Skilled/semi-skilled 570 1031 3004 8058 12663
(4.50%) (8.14%) (23.72%) (63.63%) (100.00%)
Unskilled 1699 7803 8713 41838 60053
(2.83%) (12.99%) (14.51%) (69.67%) (100.00%)
Column Total 5297 45580 28974 138977 218828
(2.42%) (20.83%) (13.24%) (63.51%) (100.00%)
Note: Frequencies (Row Percent).
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Table 19: Summary Measures of Altham Statistics
J N.Blacks N.Whites S.Whites S.Blacks Stayers
J . . . . .
N.Blacks 6.98*** . . . .
N.Whites 11.99*** 4.12*** . . .
S. Whites 12.77*** 6.03*** 5.14*** . .
S. Blacks 12.77*** 6.71*** 6.23*** 1.98*** .
Stayers 13.21*** 7.21*** 6.76*** 2.36*** .
Migrants 11.90*** 4.07*** 6.62*** 5.38*** 6.04***
Note: J is an independence matrix in which all the odds ratios are one. Significance levels for the likelihood ratio 
chi-squared statistic G2.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 20: Intergenerational Occupational Mobility, Blacks
Son’s Occupation
Father’s Occupation White Collar Farmer Skilled/semi-skilled Unskilled Row Total
Southern Black Migrants
White Collar 165 4 222 905 1296
(12.73%) (0.31%) (17.13%) (69.83%) (100.00%)
Farmer 1042 182 5548 21571 28343
(3.68%) (0.64%) (19.57%) (76.11%) (100.00%)
Skilled/semi-skilled 253 4 817 2599 3673
(6.89%) (0.11%) (22.24%) (70.76%) (100.00%)
Unskilled 698 43 2730 10500 13971
(5.00%) (0.31%) (19.54%) (75.16%) (100.00%)
Column Total 2158 233 9317 35575 47283
(4.56%) (0.49%) (19.70%) (75.24%) (100.00%)
Southern Black Stayers
White Collar 256 369 437 1593 2655
(9.64%) (13.90%) (16.46%) (60.00%) (100.00%)
Farmer 1565 36191 11050 65012 113818
(1.38%) (31.80%) (9.71%) (57.12%) (100.00%)
Skilled/semi-skilled 317 1027 2187 5459 8990
(3.53%) (11.42%) (24.33%) (60.72%) (100.00%)
Unskilled 1001 7760 5983 31338 46082
(2.17%) (16.84%) (12.98%) (68.00%) (100.00%)
Column Total 3139 45347 19657 103402 171545
(1.83%) (26.43%) (11.46%) (60.28%) (100.00%)




Father’s Occupation White Collar Farmer Skilled/semi-skilled Unskilled Row Total
Northern Blacks
White Collar 285 5 236 614 1140
(25.00%) (0.44%) (20.70%) (53.86%) (100.00%)
Farmer 29 0 58 122 209
(13.88%) (0.00%) (27.75%) (58.37%) (100.00%)
Skilled/semi-skilled 298 4 627 1406 2335
(12.76%) (0.17%) (26.85%) (60.21%) (100.00%)
Unskilled 990 32 1849 5648 8519
(11.62%) (0.38%) (21.70%) (66.30%) (100.00%)
Column Total 1602 41 2770 7790 12203
(13.13%) (0.34%) (22.70%) (63.84%) (100.00%)
Note: Frequencies (Row Percent).
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Table 21: Summary Measures of Altham Statistics, All Blacks in the North
J N.Whites S.Black Stayers
All Blacks in North 12.30*** 7.87*** 5.89***
N.Blacks 6.98*** 4.12*** 7.21***
S.Black Migrants 11.90*** 6.62*** 6.04***
Note: J is an independence matrix in which all the odds ratios are one. Significance levels for the likelihood ratio 
chi-squared statistic G2.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.




THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT MIGRATION ON
EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES OF BLACK NORTHERNERS
A.1 CREATING THE LINKED CENSUS SAMPLE FOR
NORTHERN BLACKS 1910-30
In this section, I detailed my linking procedures and discussed the representativeness of my
linked sample to the initial sample.
Initial linking sample in 1910 I started with the 1910 complete-count census and
limited the sample to northern-born black males, aged 0 to 17 (inclusive of endpoints),
residing with their parent or step-parent in the North. The age restriction is to ensure that
these black sons were young enough to be living with their parents in 1910 and were old
enough to be participating in the labor force in 1930. This generated an initial sample of
60,705 northern-born sons, some of them shared the same household heads.1
Final linking sample in 1930 Age-heaping is well documented in historical settings
(A’Hearn et al. (2009)). Examining the matched samples produced by IPUMS, Feigenbaum
(2016) shows that all the matched records have birth year differing by no more than 3
years. Allowing age to vary with a ± 3 year band, my final linking sample includes all the
northern-born black males, aged 17 to 40.
Linking variables One of the challenges in linking historical records is the absence of
1Gender for the head of household could be either male or female.
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unique personal identifiers such as the social security number. As a result, historical records
linking relies on variables that are not supposed to change over time. They are names, race,
gender, birth year, and birthplace. Note that parents’ birthplaces were less frequently used
in existing linking literature, because these variables are either not available or have been
costly for scholars to link immigrants in the past studies: many immigrants reported very
specific birthplace in one source (“Wuyishan, Fujian”), but only a general description in
another (“China”).2 In theory, adding parents’ birthplaces could help increase not only the
accuracy of linkage but also the match rate.3 Since the majority of blacks in my sample are
domestic-born, and the state of birth variables are pretty clean and complete in the 1910
and 1930 censuses, I include parents’ birthplaces to increase my match quality.
Linking method In reality, the presence of errors in these key identifying informa-
tion posts another challenge. Feigenbaum (2016) developed a regression-based, supervised
machine-learning approach that could help us tackle this challenge (discussed later).4 It
starts by building a “ground truth” sample. I manually identify possible matches for 2,696
individuals from 1910 initial linking sample (approximately 5%). After limiting candidate
matches from 1930 to those with the same birthplace, race, sex, first letter of first and last
names, age distance less than 3 and name Jaro-Winkler distance greater than 0.8, each per-
son in 1910 from this training sample has around 5 candidate matches on average, with the
maximum number of candidate matches equal to 78. In deciding the best match, I compare
names (including middle name) and parents’ birthplaces across candidate matches. When
a person has more than one candidate matches sharing the same identifiable information,
both pairs are determined as non-match since it is impossible for me to decide which pair
should be the correct match. Table A1 provides a simple illustration of this manual process
in determining a match.
I then use a probit regression to model these trade-offs and predict the score of a match
2Feigenbaum (2016) mentioned that only those respondents entered on the 14th or 29th line of each enumeration
page in the 1940 complete-count census were asked additional questions on mother’s and father’s place of birth.
3For example, Ferrie’s method with common names using phonetic name cleaning method has lower match rate
because the phonetic name cleaning method took away variation from the identifying variables. Since all the candidate
matches sharing the same identifiable information would be dropped, adding extra identifiable information reduces
the number of common records. In another example, Bleakley and Ferrie (2016) linked sons of lottery winners from
1850 to the 1860-1880 censuses, and had a lower linking rate for 1860-1870 than for 1880 due to lacking data on
parents’ birthplaces (included for the first time in 1880).
4Other approaches to link individuals across historical datasets see Abramitzky et al. (2018)), Abramitzky et al.
(2014), Goeken et al. (2011), and Ferrie (1996).
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based on a series of characteristics deriving from the basic identifying variables (See Table
A2). The best match, according to Feigenbaum (2016), should be the one with the highest
score and the score should be higher than a threshold chosen by the researcher (i.e., absolute
threshold), in addition, the ratio of the highest score to the second highest score should
exceed another threshold selected by the researcher (i.e., relative threshold). The higher the
thresholds are, the smaller the matched sample size would be.
The absolute threshold ranges from 0 to 1, as the predicted score cannot exceed 1. The
relative threshold, however, ranges from 1 to∞ because it is the ratio of two scores between
0 and 1. To find the appropriate thresholds, I loop over the absolute threshold with an
increment of 0.01 each time between 0 and 1. At a given absolute threshold, I loop over
the relative threshold with an increment of 0.05 each time between 1 and 2. To assess the
match quality, I randomly select 2
3
of the ground truth sample as the training set to train
the algorithm and use the remaining 1
3
of the ground truth sample as the test set to evaluate
the algorithm performance at each combination of the thresholds. To avoid the possibility
of getting low share of false matches due to random luck in selecting training and test sets,
I performed 50 iterations on each combination of the thresholds to obtain the statistics of
mean and standard deviation for both the share of false matches (Type I) and the share
of missed matches (Type II). To illustrate, Panel A in Figure A1 plots average false match
rate over the full range of absolute threshold given each level of relative threshold ranging
between 1 and 2; Panel B in Figure A1 presents the average false match rate over relative
threshold given each level of absolute threshold ranging between 0.2 and 0.39.5 Figure A2
graph for the average missed match rate.
Ideally, I would like to minimize both the false match rate and the missed match rate.
However, these two have a negative relationship: increasing both thresholds will decrease
false match rate, but increase missed match rate.6 In a two-dimensional world, for example,
fixing the relative threshold at a certain level (see Figure A3), then we can compare the
marginal benefit of increasing absolute threshold in decreasing false match rate with the
marginal cost it has in increasing missed match rate. We can find out until which point of
5The pattern is the same for the full range of both absolute and relative thresholds.
6This negative relationship is consistent with the findings in Bailey et al. (2017) using IPUMS historical census
data.
93
the absolute threshold that the marginal benefit would exceed the marginal cost. Applying
this logic to every level of relative threshold, we can find the corresponding optimal absolute
threshold. Similarly, we can also fix the absolute threshold at a certain level, then find the
corresponding optimal relative threshold.7 Figure A4 shows that there exist one and only
one intersection point when the absolute threshold equals 0.36, and the relative threshold
equals 1.05.
Representativeness It is important to ensure that selection into the linked sample is
not biased; otherwise, it will prevent me from generalizing any result to the target popula-
tion. Long and Ferrie (2013) argues that “as long as the matching process does not skew
the sample, the set of matched individuals should also be representative of the national
populations.” They assess the representativeness of their linked sample by running probit
regressions on an appended sample consisting of both the linked sample and the initial link-
ing sample. The dependent variable is 1 for individuals from the linked sample and 0 for
individuals from the initial linking sample. Each linked individual thus enter the regression
twice to facilitate comparison with the weighted regressions. Following their approach, Table
A3 column 1 evaluates the representativeness of my linked sample.8 It is reassuring that the
linked sample and the initial sample are very similar in the majority of baseline character-
istics, though some variables exert a statistically significant influence on the probability of
linkage. To eliminate these variables’ impact, I construct weights to produce linked samples
that would duplicate the marginal frequencies of the characteristics in the initial sample. Af-
ter the weights are imposed on the linked individuals, they are statistically indistinguishable
from the target population (see column 2 of Table A3).
Comparing with another matching approach Because of the cost of building a
“ground truth” sample, many studies use the iterative matching approach to link individuals
across censuses (both the details on how to implement this approach and STATA code are
available online).9 The basic idea of this approach is to link the unique records from both
the initial sample and the final sample, assuming that all of the linking characteristics in
7This approach is essentially the same as minimizing || ∆ | false match rate - λ | ∆ | missed match rate| as we
change the thresholds by assigning λ = 1. The optimal thresholds might change for a different λ.




the unique records are correctly measured (Abramitzky et al. (2012); Ferrie (1996)). Based
on this approach, I build an independent linking sample where I avoid using phonetic name
cleaning methods by requiring the exact match on raw names.10 The sample match rate is
11.79%.11
Comparing the linked records across the two different samples that I have constructed, I
find that (1) the best match decided by the machine learning approach may not be the one
that exactly match on all identifying variables; (2) not all the pairs that exactly match on
all identifying variables would be chosen as the best match (see Figure A5). It is easy to
understand the first point, but why the pairs that exactly match on all are not determined
as a match in the machine learning approach?
To illustrate, I use a made-up example in Table A4 where we have two people, “Hickly
aged 10” and “Hickley aged 11” in 1910. Assuming they share the same first name, race,
gender, birthplace, and parents’ birthplace, the only difference here is their supposed last
name and age. As mentioned, linking variables such as names and age presented in the
data could have been mis-measured by individuals’ misreporting, enumerators’ misspelling,
or census workers’ mis-digitization. If everything is correctly recorded, “Hickly aged 10”
from 1910 will be linked to “Hickly aged 30” from 1930, and “Hickley aged 11” from 1910
will be linked to “Hickley aged 31” from 1930, using the iterative matching approach. If
error C occurs, however, “Hickly aged 10” from 1910 will be linked to “Hickley aged 30”
from 1930, and “Hickley aged 11” from 1910 will be linked to “Hickly aged 30” from 1930,
using the same approach. These types of one-to-one matches might not be made using
the machine-learning approach because either Hickly or Hickley will have more than one
candidate matches and their score difference might not be high enough to pass the relative
threshold. So the supervised machine-learning approach is not only able to identify more
matches but also less prone to this type of error.
Why is the sample match rate based on the supervised machine-learning approach
(40.68%) so much higher than the sample match rate based on the iterative matching ap-
10A recent paper by Bailey et al. (2017) compares various matching algorithms and shows that (1) algorithms
using NYSIIS and Soundex tend to increase Type I errors without reducing Type II error rates (2) erroneous matches
biased the estimates for intergenerational mobility.
11comparing to a small ground truth sample, 21 out of 572 pairs that are identified as the match by the algorithm
is determined as non-match by the researcher due to inconsistent middle names (i.e., false positive rate = 3.67%).
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proach? The latter required unique records from both initial and final linking sample. For
example, in Table A4, if error A occurs, “Hickly aged 10” will be dropped out of the initial
linking sample due to non-uniqueness and we will not even try to find them in 1930. If
error B occurs, “Hickly aged 30” will be dropped out of the final linking sample due to non-
uniqueness and we will not be able to find a match for them. Another reason for the iterative
matching approach to have a lower match rate is its requirement of exact matches on all
linking characteristics. In the machine learning sample, many northern-born blacks from
1910 have only one candidate match from 1930 after blocking on birthplace, name distance,
and age. These unique candidate matches do not always have the exact name string due to
misspelling, but we could be confident that they are the appropriate matches under certain
condition.12 Under such circumstances, the cost of using the iterative matching approach
is enormous. Therefore, the supervised machine-learning approach is better suited for the
study conducted in this paper.
1268.45% (16,905 out of the 24,696) of the matches made by the algorithm are those with unique candidate matches.
Although these pairs are only subjected to the absolute threshold requirement, their mean score is 0.92 and median
is 0.98, much higher than the score of the best match for 1 to N pairs (mean=0.75, median=0.79). The match rate
will be 12.83% ( 24696−16905
60705
) if we exclude these unique matches.
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Figure A1: Match Quality Assessment Over Absolute/Relative Threshold: False Matches
Panel A. Absolute Threshold
Panel B. Relative Threshold
Notes: The line with blue color empty dot corresponds to relative (absolute) threshold equal to 1 (0.2) and the line 
with red color solid dot corresponds to relative (absolute) threshold equal to 2 (0.39). At a given absolute (relative) 
threshold, false match rate (i.e. the proportion of algorithm determined match to be wrong) is decreasing as the 
relative (absolute) threshold is increasing (i.e. moving from blue empty dot line to red solid dot line). For all levels 
of the relative (absolute) threshold, false match rate is decreasing as the absolute (relative) threshold is increasing.
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Figure A2: Match Quality Assessment Over Absolute/Relative Threshold: Missed Matches
Panel A. Absolute Threshold
Panel B. Relative Threshold
Notes: The line with blue color empty dot corresponds to relative (absolute) threshold equal to 1 (0.2) and the line 
on the top corresponds to relative (absolute) threshold equal to 2 (0.39). At a given absolute (relative) threshold, 
missed match rate (i.e. the proportion of true match failed by the algorithm) is increasing as the relative (absolute) 
threshold is increasing (i.e. moving from blue empty dot line to red solid dot line). For all levels of the relative 
(absolute) threshold, missed match rate is increasing as the absolute (relative) threshold is increasing.
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Figure A3: Inverse Relationship Between False Match Rates and Missed Match Rates
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Figure A4: Optimal Thresholds: Northern-born Blacks
Notes: X-axis is the absolute threshold and Y-axis is the relative threshold.
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Figure A5: Comparing Linked Samples Across Linking Approaches
Notes: The total linked records in machine-learning sample is 24,696, and the total linked records in iterative 
matching sample is 7,156. The number of pairs that were identified as linked in both approach is 5,968.
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Table A1: A Simple Example in Building “Ground Truth” Sample
1910 1930
Surname Given fbpl mbpl Surname Given fbpl mbpl match
Carter Johnson Missouri Missouri Carter John Missouri Missouri 0
Carter John H Missouri Missouri 0
Cade John Missouri Missouri 0
Carter John William Missouri Missouri 0
Carey John Missouri Missouri 0
Carter John W Missouri Missouri 0
Jones William Virginia New York Johnson William Connecticut Connecticut 0
Jones William M South Carolina South Carolina 0
Jones William A Virginia Connecticut 0
Johnson William Connecticut Connecticut 0
Jones William Virginia New York 1
Jones William S Virginia North Carolina 0
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Table A2: Probit Regression on the Match Dummy in the Human Review Process
VARIABLES match
First name distance, Jaro-Winkler -4.143***
(1.0129)
Last name distance, Jaro-Winkler -8.406***
(0.7912)
Absolute value difference in year of birth is 1 -0.527***
(0.0882)
Absolute value difference in year of birth is 2 -0.862***
(0.0954)




First and last name match (including middle name if available) 0.336**
(0.135)
More than one match for first and last name -1.029***
(0.1312)
Last letter of first name matches -0.0867
(0.1214)
Last letter of last name matches 0.201*
(0.1120)
Middle initial matches, if there is a middle initial 0.305***
(0.0804)
Father’s birthplace matches 0.560***
(0.0697)
Mother’s birthplace matches 0.455***
(0.0695)
First name Soundex match 0.470***
(0.1503)






Akaike’s information criterion 2123.189
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3: Probit Marginal Effects on Linkage
VARIABLES (1) unweighted (2) weighted
birthplace (New England Division) -0.003 -0.001
(0.085) (0.083)
birthpalce (East North Central Division) 0.032 0.027
(0.084) (0.080)
birthplace (West North Central Division) -0.016 -0.024
(0.093) (0.089)
birthplace (Mountain Division) -0.026 -0.042
(0.164) (0.160)
birthplace (Pacific Division) -0.089 -0.094
(0.136) (0.126)
residence division (New England) 0.017 0.017
(0.085) (0.082)
residence division (East North Central) -0.010 -0.007
(0.084) (0.080)
residence division (West North Central) -0.036 -0.029
(0.093) (0.089)
residence division (Mountain) -0.191 -0.189
(0.193) (0.187)
residence division (Pacific) 0.108 0.114
(0.131) (0.122)
Son’s age 6-11 -0.055*** -0.011
(0.019) (0.019)
Son’s age 12-17 -0.091*** -0.007
(0.018) (0.018)
Mulatto (son) 0.032 0.033
(0.023) (0.023)
Urban Area -0.028** -0.004
(0.012) (0.012)
Live in Farm 0.047 0.039
(0.032) (0.032)
In School (son) 0.016 0.016
(0.016) (0.016)
Head’s age 26-50 0.030 0.032
(0.027) (0.027)
Head’s age 51-75 0.040 0.045
(0.032) (0.032)
Head’s age 76-100 0.058 0.061
(0.142) (0.143)
Homeowner (head) 0.063*** -0.009
(0.014) (0.014)
Literacy (head) 0.058*** -0.010
(0.016) (0.016)
Speak English (head) 0.033 0.033
(0.032) (0.032)
Mulatto (head) 0.020 0.018
(0.024) (0.024)
Low White Collar Occupations (head) 0.058 0.059
(0.043) (0.043)
Skilled Blue Occupations (head) 0.008 0.007
(0.035) (0.035)
Unskilled Blue Occupations (head) -0.023 -0.021
(0.027) (0.027)
Farmer (head) -0.069* -0.043
(0.040) (0.040)





Pseudo R2 0.002 0.001
Predicted Probability 0.289 0.289
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Omitted: Middle Atlantic Division for 
birth and residence place; son’s age 0-5; head’s age 0-25; high white collar jobs for head.
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Table A4: A Made-up Example
1910 1930
Surname Age Surname Age
Without Error Hickly 10 Hickly 30
Hickley 11 Hickley 31
With Error A Hickly 10 Hickly 30
Hickly 10 Hickley 31
With Error B Hickly 10 Hickly 30
Hickley 11 Hickly 30
With Error C Hickley 10 Hickly 30
Hickly 10 Hickley 30
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A.2 CONSTRUCTING OCCUPATIONAL EARNINGS SCORE
The needs for skills is shifting over time. For example, the earnings for workers in jobs that
require higher levels of analytical skills have grown faster than jobs that require physical
skills in recent decades. In the absence of income information in the 1930 census, it is better
to use the occupational earnings from the census that is the closest to the sample year.
This consideration points me to the 1940 census, the first census year that I can observe
both occupations and income for an individual. However, there are two shortcomings of
using the 1940 wage data. Income information for self-employed workers and farmers is not
available. Collins and Wanamaker (2017) addresses these two issues by first calculating the
earnings ratio of self-employed workers over wage earners for all the occupations using the
5-percent sample of the 1960 census from IPUMS, and then scale up the average earnings of
wage workers from 1940 by this ratio to impute earnings for self-employed workers in 1940.
Following their approach, I include in the calculation only those individuals aged 17-66
(uninclusive of endpoints) and had the number of weeks worked for profit, as well as income
(either as self-employed workers ”incbusfm” or as wage earners ”incwage”), being positive. I
then calculate the average 1940 earnings for all persons sharing the same 3-digit occupation
code, race, gender, location, and working relationship. Both mulattos and darker-skinned
blacks are considered as blacks. I use three different levels of geographical location to ensure
that I have at least 50 observations per occupational cell in constructing the earnings score:
census division is the most preferred, followed by census region and nationwide.
For self-employed workers, its earnings are scaled by the ratio of the average earnings for
all the self-employed workers over the average earnings for all the wage earners in 1960 by
gender. Again, if an occupation does not include both types of workers or its observations
for either class is less than 50 in 1960, its self-employed vs. employee earning ratio would
be imputed by the average earnings for the entire self-employed workers and wage earners
instead. All these steps are done by gender separately.
There are still a few occupations that do not have enough workers to calculate an imputed
average to then scale. For this group, I assign earnings based on a broader occupational
classification by converting the 3-digit occupational code to 1-digit. For example, both
106
”Optometrists (3-digit code=070)” and ”Osteopaths (3-digit code=071)” will be assigned
the average earnings for all the ”Professional and Technical (1-digit code=0)” workers who
share the same race, location, and the working relationship.
For farmers, they are further differentiated by homeowner status. I first estimate the
earnings ratio of farmers over farm laborers in 1960, by gender and homeowner status. Then,
I scale the earnings for farm laborers in 1940 by its corresponding 1960 ratio and assign this
product to farmers of the same race, gender, and division.
Lastly, I want to learn how plausible is the constructed earnings score and how reliable
it is to measure a person’s socioeconomic standing. Figure A6 shows the average earnings
score for ten broader occupational headers by gender and race. The information conveyed
coincides with our prior, that white-collar occupations > blue-collar occupations > unskilled
ones regarding average earnings; blacks earn less than whites and males earn more than
females within the occupational category; racial earning difference is more prominent at a
higher level of skill.
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Figure A6: Sensitivity and Plausibility of the Occupational Earnings Score
Notes: The occupational earnings score assignment is based on the 3-digit IPUMS 1950 occupational classification
system which contains hundreds of detailed occupational titles. For illustration purpose, I classified them into ten
broader occupational headers shown in the vertical axis. The value in the horizontal axis reflects average
occupational earnings score. Farmers are omitted from the graph because their earnings score is further
differentiated by homeownership status in the income assignment.
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A.3 ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure A7 plots the total black population change against migrants change between 1910 and
1930. Each dot represents a northern county that experienced migrants inflow. For almost
all the counties, the points lie above the 45-degree line, suggesting that places attracted
migrants were also destinations for black northerners if they move. Moreover, it reveals that
southern black migrant influx was responsible for most of the increase in the local black
population.
Figure A8 shows an advertisement from African-American newspaper The Indianapolis
Recorder revealing that blacks were barred from amusement places run by whites. The
demand from black consumers offered the business opportunities for black establishments.
Figure A9 displays the white-collar jobs held by black northerners in my sample in 1930.
For illustration purpose, the detailed occupational titles were classified into 13 categories.
Entertainers include Actors and Actresses, Artists and Art Teachers, Entertainers (n.e.c.),
Musicians and Music Teachers, Recreation and Group Workers ; Teachers include Profes-
sors and Instructors that Subject Not Specified, Teachers (n.e.c.); Managers, Officers,
and Proprietors include Railroad Conductors, Building Managers and Superintendents,
Public administration officials and administrators (n.e.c.), Managers, officials, and propri-
etors (n.e.c.); Messengers and Mail Clerks include Express messengers and railway mail
clerks, mail carriers, messengers and office boys, Newsboys ; Clerks include Attendants at
physician’s and dentist’s office, transportation baggagemen, bank tellers, bookkeepers, bill
and account collectors, shipping and receiving clerks, telegraph operators, telephone opera-
tors, clerical and kindred workers (n.e.c.); Agent & Brokers include Insurance agents and
brokers, real estate agents and brokers ; Salesmen include Advertising agents and salesmen,
Demonstrators, Hucksters and Peddlers, Stock and bond salesmen, salesmen and sales clerk
(n.e.c.); Other Professionals, Technicians include Accountants and auditors, athletes,
chemists, chiropractors, college presidents and deans, editors and reporters, civil engineers,
electrical engineers, engineers (n.e.c.), photographers, social and welfare workers (except
group), medical and dental technicians, therapists and healers (n.e.c.), veterinarians, pro-
fessional technical and kindred workers (n.e.c.), officials lodge society union etc
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Figure A10 lists the top 20 white-collar occupations that have increasing share from 1910
to 1930. Blacks were able to hold trades in 1930 that none of their fathers had in 1910, such as
engineers and telephone operators. While black professionals such as dentists, pharmacists,
and funeral directors had significant growth, the most significant expansion within white-
collar occupations lies on low-skilled and less-profitable ones, such as mail carriers and office
boys.
Table A5 reports the full first stage results where the dependent variable is the (log)
actual migration inflow and the regressor of interest is the (log) predicted in-migration. The
first three columns correspond to the 2SLS specifications in Table 3 and Table 4. Column 4
to 9 correspond to the 2SLS specifications in Table 5 with column 4 to 6 for black sample
and 7 to 9 for the white sample. Column 2, 5, and 8 present results after including the
additional controls. Column 3, 6 and 9 report results for the sample of stayers. In all cases,
the F-stat is very high, and the instrument has a large, positive, and significant effect on the
actual migrant change. Overall, Table A5 suggests that the positive relationship between
actual and predicted in-migration is robust to the use of different specifications.
There are five variables (age, literacy, homeownership, farmer and urban status) that
have a statistically significant influence on the probability of linkage (see column (1) of
Table A3). While their magnitude is relatively small, I construct weights to eliminate these






where Pinitial (or Plinked) represents the group share of the characteristics that matter to
the linkage selectivity in the initial sample (or in the linked sample).13 I then replicate
Table 3, with these weights imposed on the linked sample. Table A6 shows that coefficients
estimated from the weighted sample are almost the same as their counterparts estimated
from the unweighted sample.
Table A7 presents results using a different instrument variable where the national outflow
of blacks from the South to the North (i.e., treating all the southern blacks as a group, as
opposed to distinguishing southern blacks by birth state) is distributed by the earlier southern
13Note that the weights cannot eliminate the impact of unobservables on the linkage probability.
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black settlement patterns in the North. The estimated effects are qualitatively similar to the
results in main text but slightly larger in magnitude.
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Figure A7: Destinations for Migrants and Black Northerners
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Figure A8: Advertisement from African-American Newspaper
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Figure A9: White Collar Jobs Held By Northern-born Blacks in 1930
Notes: For the total 1,764 northern-born blacks who held white collar jobs, I classified them into 13 categories 
above.
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Figure A10: Top 20 Occupations Among White Collar Group By Share Changes between
1910 and 1930
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Table A5: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DV: (log) Mig. Inflow
(log) Predicted Mig. Inflow 0.770*** 0.821*** 0.799*** 0.781*** 0.835*** 0.828*** 0.729*** 0.741*** 0.692***
(0.138) (0.127) (0.136) (0.139) (0.128) (0.136) (0.148) (0.128) (0.129)
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 30.96 41.59 34.42 31.73 42.86 37.28 24.41 33.76 28.68
Controls:
White Pop Change X X X X X X
County Characteristics 1880 X X X X X X
Stayer Only X X X
Observations 12,623 12,623 7,234 15,927 15,927 9,178 10,730 10,730 6,158
Note: All regressions include individual-level, family-level and county-level controls, as well as state fixed effects.
116
Table A6: Robustness on Weighted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. Prob. of Employment
(log) Mig. Inflow -0.006** -0.012* -0.012** -0.026**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Mean DV 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.864
Panel B. Percentile Rank
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.424*** 0.620** 0.571** 1.343***
(0.144) (0.277) (0.254) (0.468)
Mean DV 33.49 33.49 33.49 33.97
Panel C. (log) EarningsScorea
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.008*** 0.014** 0.013** 0.031**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012)
Mean DV 6.614 6.614 6.614 6.624
Controls:
White Pop Change X X
County Characteristics 1880 X X
Stayer Only X
Observations 12,623 12,623 12,623 7,234
County 151 151 151 149
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 31.23 41.68 34.53
county cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions include individual-level, family-level and county-level controls, as well
as state fixed effects.
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Table A7: Robustness on A Different Instrument Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. Prob. of Employment
(log) Mig. Inflow -0.006** -0.016** -0.016*** -0.033***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Mean DV 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.864
Panel B. Percentile Rank
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.421*** 0.830*** 0.780*** 1.432***
(0.143) (0.296) (0.273) (0.439)
Mean DV 33.49 33.49 33.49 33.97
Panel C. (log) EarningsScorea
(log) Mig. Inflow 0.008*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.032***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)
Mean DV 6.614 6.614 6.614 6.624
Controls:
White Pop Change X X
County Characteristics 1880 X X
Stayer Only X
Observations 12,623 12,623 12,623 7,234
County 151 151 151 149
Kleibergen Paap F-stat 31.77 39.19 33.22
county cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions include individual-level, family-level and county-level controls, as well
as state fixed effects.
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APPENDIX B
RACIAL SEGREGATION IN HOUSING MARKETS
AND THE EROSION OF BLACK WEALTH
B.1 CONSTRUCTING THE MATCHED ADDRESS SAMPLE
Each record in the census data represents an individual in a household. Each household has
a head and related members who share the same address. An address is the combination of a
house number and a street name. In an ideal world, we would know the number of individuals
and households residing at a given address. However, either the house number or the street
name entry for an individual could have been mis-recorded by the census enumerators or mis-
digitized by the contemporary census digitization workers. Therefore, some households have
incorrect or incomplete addresses, possibly leading to inaccurate counts of households in any
building. This appendix describes the algorithm we used to construct a representative set of
households for our sample cities in 1930 and 1940, focusing in particular on the challenge of
assigning all individuals to the correct address.
We first need to make sure that no household is either missing an address or assigned
more than one. We assume that the enumeration districts (EDs) and tracts reported in the
census data were transcribed correctly. A tiny fraction of EDs and tracts from the census
do not coincide with the list of EDs that we use to define our cities. We drop those EDs or
tracts, as they are likely to be institutions that were given a separate ED number.
We have digitized 1930 enumeration district boundaries (Shertzer et al. (2016)) and
obtained census tract boundary files from the National Historical Geographic Information
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System (NHGIS). We cross-check census address data by “fuzzy” matching each census street
name to a list of street names from the corresponding ED/tract obtained from the spatial
datasets. We exclude addresses on streets that have either no reasonable match or too many
potential matches among the digitized streets.
Census enumerators were instructed to survey households as they moved along a street,
and thus we do not expect to see house numbers within a street jump around. Thus, the
order in which households appear on the manuscripts should generally reflect their location
within the ED relative to neighboring households.1 To ensure that we have all the households
living in each address in our sample, we also drop any address that shares a street-block (or
the entire street-ED when the block cannot be identified) with an address that is potentially
out of order on the manuscript. We provide further details of the process below.
B.2 DETAILS ON METHODOLOGY
We make sure that every household has exactly one address composed of a street name and
house number. To begin, we assign the address information from the household head to ev-
eryone in his/her household. When the household head has partial (e.g. only a street name
or only the house number) or no information on address, we fill in information from the
household’s non-head member. We perform a series of quality checks on these imputed ad-
dresses that are described below. If the household head is missing an address and household
members disagree on either street name or house number, we impute the missing address
information from those of households listed just before this one in the census manuscripts
and flag these households.
In the case of multiple households sharing the same dwelling unit, we will have more
than one household head. When these household heads disagree on the address, we compare
each component of the addresses (the street names and house numbers) to those of adjacent
households and keep the one(s) that matches that of the most number of neighbors. We flag
all addresses imputed from adjacent households. A very small number of dwellings from the
1Our indicators of manuscript page and line numbers are not very reliable, so we use the household IDs assigned
by IPUMS as proxy for the order in which households appear in the original census manuscripts.
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1940 Census seem to have members belonging to different EDs/tracts. As with street names
and house numbers, we assume the household heads ED/tract is the correct one. In the case
of multi-family households, we compare each candidate ED/tract with those of households
appearing immediately before and after on the census manuscripts, and only retain the
EDs/tracts with the highest number of matches. We have a few households located at the
intersection of EDs/tracts, and we flag these as well.
Then we standardize street names in the census, which are noisy and frequently rid-
dled with typos. We first standardize all the directional prefix and street suffix, convert
ordinal street numbers to their cardinal text forms, and remove any redundant information
from street name (such as “Block A”). We then match these formatted street names to our
digitized 1930 city streets to standardize further the names. We create a crosswalk of digi-
tized street names, 1930 EDs, and 1940 tracts and fuzzy match them with the set of unique
census street names by ED/tract (allowing some margin of error in the string match). We
use STATA’s reclink2 command for this task. If a census street matches to more than one
digitized street (a “one-to-many” match) within an ED/tract, then we flag all the digitized
streets that were a match. Eventually we drop all Census records where the street does not
match a digitized street or matches one that is flagged as part of a one-to-many match. Note
that the process is sensitive to the margin of error that we allow in our string match. A
wide error margin means we will have more one-to-many matches and fewer non-matches,
whereas with a narrow error margin, we will have more non-matches and fewer one-to-many
matches. The former introduces false one-to-one matches that might otherwise stay un-
matched, whereas the latter introduces false one-to-one matches that might otherwise be
matched to many. Thus, a conservative approach is to allow a wide margin of error, but nar-
row enough that we are still left with a reasonably sized sample after dropping one-to-many
and non-matches.
House numbers, like street names, are also prone to errors and typos. The next step is
to standardize house numbers as best as we can across ED/tracts and census years. When
the house number variable is just one clear number, we leave it as it is. When it is not (e.g.,
“945/6”, “4531 667” or “1??2”), we try to identify a minimum and a maximum possible
house number. For instance, when the reported house number is “4531 667”, we treat it as
121
ranging from 667 to 4531 and flag all addresses on the same street block and ED with house
numbers in that range.2 We assume a “?” can range from 0 to 9, so that house number
“1??2” ranges from 1002 to 1992. We treat separators like “/”, “-”, “&”, “+”, “˜’’ and “,” as
spaces when identifying the range, while we ignore alphabets (treating “5a” as “5”) and other
non-alphanumeric characters (e.g. parentheses and brackets). All problematic addresses are
flagged.
We do not have digitized historical house numbers as with street names to validate our
cleaning process. Instead, we perform a number of quality checks based on the ordering of
households in the census manuscripts and flag households that fail to satisfy these checks.
Failing one or more of these reality checks implies that the re-formatted and standardized
addresses are unlikely to be correct. These flagged households include cases where:
1. the address differs from that of adjacent households on the manuscript when adjacent
households share an address,
2. only the house number matches that of one adjacent household, and only the street name
matches that of the other adjacent household,
3. the house number differs from adjacent house numbers by more than 10 along the same
street,
4. the house number changes non-monotonically (and differs from adjacent house numbers
by at least 4) along the same street, and
5. the address is (either partially or completely) imputed from that of the preceding house-
hold when adjacent street names differ.
We drop households in all addresses that were flagged in any of the previous steps. If a
households address is flagged, the correct address is likely to be that of adjacent households
on the manuscript, given our assumption on the path of the enumerators. To avoid un-
dercounting the individuals in these adjacent addresses, we also drop all addresses adjacent
to flagged addresses on the manuscript. Thus, we generate a sample of addresses that are
2There are alternative ways of interpreting a reported house number of “4531 467”. The second number might be
an apartment number within the building, or the building might span house numbers 4531 to 4667. However, given
that we eventually drop all street blocks intersecting this range of numbers, we believe our range assignment is the
most conservative in dealing with such ambiguity. The street block is defined by the street name and the hundreds
of the house number.
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correct with a reasonable degree of accuracy that is our baseline.3
Finally, from each sample, we retain only the addresses that appear in both the 1930 and
the 1940 Census. Since we have digitized 1930 ED boundaries and 1940 tract boundaries,
we further make sure that the reported EDs (in 1930) and tracts (in 1940) corresponding to
each address overlap spatially.
3If the street block of a flagged address cannot be identified credibly (e.g. when the house number is completely
non- numeric or the range of house numbers is unrealistically large), we drop all addresses on the same street and
ED.
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Figure B1: Geocoded Detroit Addresses
Notes: the figure shows the addresses in our sample for the city of Detroit that could be geocoded against a map of 1940 
enumeration districts produced by Logan and Zhang (2017).
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Figure B2: Racial Transition in Geocoded Blocks in Detroit
Notes: the figure shows the addresses in our sample for the city of Detroit that could be geocoded against a map of 1940 
enumeration districts produced by Logan and Zhang (2017). Blocks are color-coded as follows: blue blocks were less than 5 
percent black in both 1930 and 1940, pink blocks were less than 5 percent black in 1930 and more than 5 percent black in 
1940, and black blocks were over 5 percent black in both 1930 and 1940.
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Table B1: Address Statistics for Block Sample
All Households Addresses Blocks Addresses
Total Households Quality Address Unique Addresses Unique Blocks per Block
1930 1940 1930 1940 1930 1940 1930 1940 1930 1940
Baltimore 193,979 245,862 147,962 132,680 118,741 97,264 8,249 7,831 14.4 12.4
Boston 182,090 211,731 132,944 135,944 62,913 61,052 4,090 4,051 15.4 15.1
Brooklyn 614,082 752,606 390,826 358,432 157,005 125,803 8,935 7,450 17.6 16.9
Chicago 845,436 1,025,731 545,383 437,973 278,694 198,297 20,530 17,766 13.6 11.2
Cincinnati 124,321 143,864 87,188 65,169 51,436 38,384 4,898 4,009 10.5 9.6
Cleveland 222,856 247,713 129,774 99,907 86,588 65,744 10,991 8,745 7.9 7.5
Detroit 370,556 451,198 225,457 219,961 168,955 163,406 18,380 18,169 9.2 9.0
Manhattan 470,552 614,786 188,258 191,471 25,178 20,876 1,854 1,856 13.6 11.2
Philadelphia 459,749 515,472 338,928 254,737 291,919 211,705 15,054 12,033 19.4 17.6
Pittsburgh 153,628 185,039 107,276 102,587 78,809 66,712 7,878 7,134 10.0 9.4
St. Louis 216,133 225,794 116,945 111,305 77,551 72,166 7,117 6,560 10.9 11.0
Total/Average 3,853,382 4,619,796 2,410,941 2,110,166 1,397,789 1,121,409 107,976 95,604 12.9 11.9
Note: The first two columns report the number of households reported in the census in each city. “Quality
addresses” are the households for which we were able to assign an address that passed all quality checks described
in the Data Appendix B. “Unique addresses” are addresses that both pass the quality checks and are unique
with a street name, street number, and 1930 enumeration district. We use postal service convention and assign
house numbers to blocks using hundreds within a given street name. “Unique blocks” are the number of unique
blocks represented by our sample of unique addresses. The last column of the table reports the number of
unique addresses per unique block. This is the sample of addresses we used to construct our block sample.
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Table B2: Address Sample Statistics
Households with address found in both census years Addresses Households
Total Trimmed Sample Quality Address Unique Addresses per Address
1930 1940 1930 1940 1930 1940 1930 1940 1930 1940
Baltimore 110,312 125,598 98,780 111,757 67,925 75,888 57,287 57,287 1.2 1.3
Boston 122,353 136,230 100,785 109,334 67,008 71,343 33,267 33,267 2.0 2.1
Brooklyn 365,589 413,796 254,723 286,483 144,116 159,787 62,108 62,108 2.3 2.6
Chicago 443,948 497,700 355,109 389,081 190,802 207,627 104,553 104,553 1.8 2.0
Cincinnati 78,245 85,719 67,293 72,601 33,132 35,112 20,967 20,967 1.6 1.7
Cleveland 124,151 135,182 111,170 118,948 48,676 51,126 34,843 34,843 1.4 1.5
Detroit 212,211 228,290 184,660 194,112 95,309 98,560 76,845 76,845 1.2 1.3
Manhattan 235,841 299,774 95,304 119,594 29,369 36,001 3,913 3,913 7.5 9.2
Philadelphia 227,479 244,202 206,716 218,856 145,313 152,650 131,469 131,469 1.1 1.2
Pittsburgh 84,028 94,428 73,731 81,806 43,172 47,767 32,289 32,289 1.3 1.5
St. Louis 141,183 148,756 124,771 130,522 48,185 50,361 34,239 34,239 1.4 1.5
Total/Average 2,145,340 2,409,675 1,673,042 1,833,094 913,007 986,222 591,780 591,780 2.1 2.3
Note: The “Total” columns report the number of households with addresses we were able to locate in both the
1930 and 1940 censuses. We trimmed this sample to eliminate transcription errors and institutions (we drop any
households with more than 10 members, any household with more than three heads, any addresses with monthly
rent greater than $100, and finally any addresses with a value greater than $20,000). The “Trimmed Sample”
columns report the number of households without problematic census values in both 1930 and 1940. The
“Quality Address” columns report the number of households without problematic census values that passed
the address quality checks described in the Data Appendix B. The “Unique Addresses” columns report the
number of addresses represented by this sample of households. This is the sample of addresses we used in our
address-level analysis.
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Table B3: Selection into Sample
Year All Quality Address Matched Address
Individuals 1930 15,591,308 9,894,466 4,495,743
1940 15,729,224 7,560,898 4,345,911
Households 1930 3,845,617 2,406,975 1,082,691
1940 4,610,562 2,106,438 1,180,009
Addresses 1930 2,077,442 1,407,878 659,688
1940 2,217,640 1,125,845 659,688
Households per address 1930 1.85 1.71 1.64
1940 2.08 1.87 1.79
Individuals per address 1930 7.51 7.03 6.81
1940 7.09 6.72 6.59
Average household size 1930 4.40 4.39 4.39
1940 3.87 3.96 3.99
Distance to CBD (tract centroid) 1930 4.43 4.32 4.30
1940 4.61 4.47 4.30
Population density (tract) 1930 0.013 0.013 0.013
1940 0.012 0.012 0.013
Percent black (tract) 1930 0.076 0.073 0.066
1940 0.084 0.078 0.078
Note: The “All” column reports statistics for the full sample of census records across all ten cities. The “Quality
Address” column reports statistics for census records that had an address that passed our quality checks as
described in the Data Appendix. The “Matched Address” column reports statistics for the sample of quality
addresses that could be matched across the 1930 and 1940 census. The distance to CBD is defined as the




INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY IN PREWAR AMERICA:
A COMPARISON BY RACE AND REGION
C.1 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
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Table C1: Summary Measures of Altham Statistics, Excluding Farmers
J N.Blacks N.Whites S.Whites S.Blacks Stayers
J . . . . .
N.Blacks 3.63*** . . . .
N.Whites 3.66*** 1.32*** . . .
S. Whites 5.45*** 2.16*** 2.15*** . .
S. Blacks 5.09*** 1.66*** 2.04*** 0.69*** .
Stayers 5.79*** 2.30*** 2.77*** 1.05*** .
Migrants 3.79*** 1.09*** 0.83** 1.82*** 2.44***
Note: J is an independence matrix in which all the odds ratios are one. Significance levels for the likelihood ratio 
chi-squared statistic G2.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table C2: Summary Measures of Altham Statistics, Separating Farm Labors from
Unskilled Workers
J N.Blacks N.Whites S.Whites S.Blacks Stayers
J . . . . .
N.Blacks 17.72*** . . . .
N.Whites 18.44*** 8.47*** . . .
S. Whites 20.60*** 7.97*** 6.12*** . .
S. Blacks 19.92*** 9.31*** 8.53*** 4.61*** .
Stayers 20.27*** 9.73*** 8.98*** 5.12*** .
Migrants 17.16*** 8.80*** 10.53*** 10.07*** 8.95***
Note: J is an independence matrix in which all the odds ratios are one. Significance levels for the likelihood ratio 
chi-squared statistic G2.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table C3: Summary Measures of Altham Statistics, Exact Matches
J N.Blacks N.Whites S.Whites S.Blacks Stayers
J . . . . .
N.Blacks 10.43*** . . . .
N.Whites 13.39*** 7.75*** . . .
S. Whites 14.30*** 9.79*** 5.71*** . .
S. Blacks 14.31*** 10.94*** 7.33*** 2.78*** .
Stayers 14.65*** 11.29*** 7.74*** 3.07*** .
Migrants 12.20*** 5.88*** 8.97*** 8.79*** 8.95***
Note: J is an independence matrix in which all the odds ratios are one. Significance levels for the likelihood ratio 
chi-squared statistic G2.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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